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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will provide a background look at Burma’s recent history from World 
War II to present day to examine how the current state of affairs came about in the 
country.  Burma’s diverse ethnic groups and the nearly continuous insurgencies since 
World War II, will be analyzed relative to a short period of democracy (following British 
colonial rule) from 1948 to 1962, to repressive military rule from 1962 to today.   
This thesis examines how Burma’s military juntas have retained internal control 
in the face of insurgent and pro-democracy movements. Burma’s geographic location, 
between the rising powers of India and China, its abundant natural resources, its drug 
trade, and the government’s human rights abuses, all make the country important to 
United States’ foreign relations in Asia.  This thesis will look at the current U.S. policies 
toward Burma and explore possible Burmese policy options for the U.S. in the future.   
The thesis will conclude with recommendations for future policy based on the research to 
determine if the United States can effect change in Burma.   
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
II. BURMA OVERVIEW.................................................................................................7 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................7 
B. GEOGRAPHY .................................................................................................7 
C. RESOURCES ...................................................................................................9 
D. DEMOGRAPHICS..........................................................................................9 
E. STATES, DIVISIONS, CAPITAL .................................................................9 
F. ETHNIC GROUPS ........................................................................................10 




5. Kachin .................................................................................................14 
6. Rakhine (Arakanese) .........................................................................15 
7. Chin .....................................................................................................17 
8. Karenni ...............................................................................................17 
9. Chinese and Indians...........................................................................18 
G. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND..................................................................19 
1. Bagan, Taungoo, Konbaung Kingdoms...........................................19 
2. British Colonization...........................................................................20 
3. World War II – Japanese Occupation .............................................21 
4. United States, British, And Burmese Allies .....................................22 
5. Independence......................................................................................23 
6. Burma’s Initial Independent Government ......................................25 
7. Ne Win’s Coup ...................................................................................26 
8. Ne Win’s Government .......................................................................27 
9. Ne Win Steps Down ...........................................................................29 
10. National Democracy Movement and the Rise of the SLORC........30 
11. SLORC Policies..................................................................................31 
12. SPDC Assumes Power .......................................................................32 
H. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................32 
III. COUNTERINSURGENCY.......................................................................................35 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................35 
B. INTERNAL SECURITY – THE REGIME’S PRIORITY ........................36 
C. COUNTERINSURGENCY – DEMOCRACY VERSUS 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE...........................................................................37 
D. INSURGENCY IN BURMA .........................................................................38 
E. COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES .............40 
F. BURMESE COUNTERINSURGENCY THROUGH COERCION.........41 
G. SLORC/SPDC’S NEW STRATEGY ...........................................................43 
H. RESOURCE CONTROL ..............................................................................45 
 viii
I. INTELLIGENCE IN BURMA .....................................................................46 
J. JUNTA INTELLIGENCE ............................................................................48 
K. OTHER METHODS OF SOCIAL CONTROL .........................................49 
L. MILITARY LOYALTY................................................................................51 
M. EXTERNAL THREATS ...............................................................................52 
N. DIPLOMACY ................................................................................................52 
O. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................53 
IV. RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT, AND REGIONAL/INTERNATIONAL 
INFLUENCE (POST-1988).......................................................................................55 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................55 
B. THE SLORC’S TRANSITION FROM NE WIN’S SOCIALISM............55 
C.  RESOURCES AND TRADE ........................................................................56 
1. Natural Gas.........................................................................................56 
2. Tourism...............................................................................................58 
3. Teak and Hardwood ..........................................................................59 
4. Gems....................................................................................................60 
5. Fishing.................................................................................................60 
D. FOREIGN ENGAGEMENT.........................................................................61 
1. China ...................................................................................................61 
2. Thailand..............................................................................................63 
3. India ....................................................................................................65 
4. Japan ...................................................................................................67 
5. Bangladesh..........................................................................................68 
6. Singapore ............................................................................................69 
7. European Union .................................................................................70 
8. ASEAN................................................................................................71 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................72 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................75 
A. UNITED STATES SANCTIONS .................................................................75 
B. LEGITIMACY AND SOVEREIGNTY.......................................................77 
C. THE UNITED STATES AND BURMESE SOVEREIGNTY ...................78 
1. Indirect Approach..............................................................................78 
2. Future Engagement in Burma ..........................................................79 
3. Nuclear Intervention..........................................................................80 
4. Pandemic Intervention ......................................................................80 
D. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS....................................................................81 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................83 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................97 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Map of Burma ....................................................................................................8 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank Anna Simons for her support throughout this process.  She 
provided excellent guidance, insight, and encouragement.  I truly appreciate her 
professional dedication, and this thesis would not have been possible without her. I also 
thank Col Brian Greenshields for his leadership and mentorship throughout my time at 
NPS. 
Thank you also to COL Richard Thomas, Chief of Staff at Special Operations 
Command Pacific for coordinating an interview with a former Defense Attaché to Burma.  
I appreciate the Defense Attaché’s providing background information and sharing his 
insight on Burma.   I would also like to thank COL (Ret.) Tim Heinemann for taking his 
time to explain the inner workings of Burmese politics and ethnic conflict; it was truly 
valuable.   
Finally, thanks to my family for their support and patience during the writing of 
this paper.  
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
                                                
I. INTRODUCTION 
The crisis between the United States and Burma arising from the actions 
and policies of the Government of Burma, including its engaging in large-
scale repression of the democratic opposition in Burma, that led to the 
declaration of a national emergency on May 20, 1997, and its expansion 
on October 18, 2007, and April 30 2008, has not been resolved. These 
actions and policies are hostile to the U.S. interests and pose a continuing 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy 
of the United States.1 
George W. Bush 
May 16, 2008 
 
In May 2008, President Bush publicly identified that the policies of the 
Government of Burma as a threat to the national security of the United States.  
Considering the gravity of this statement, it would seem that immediate and aggressive 
action on the part of the United States toward the ruling Burmese junta would have been 
warranted and was imminent.  However, the United States confirmed what it has done for 
the past 20 years, which is to rely on economic sanctions to influence the Burmese 
Government to adopt more democratic and humane policies towards its people.  Yet, the 
reality is that U.S. (and Western nations) sanctions have not eliminated or reduced the 
ruling junta’s repressiveness of its people.  
Given that sanctions have had little impact on Burmese Government policies, this 
thesis addresses how authoritarian military governments in Burma have managed to gain 
and maintain power through brutal counterinsurgency measures, co-opting the 
opposition, and developing regional relationships which have shielded the regime from 
international influence.   
The present military regime in Burma has been in power since 1988.  Following 
severe crackdowns on Burmese pro-democracy movement in that same year, and the 
subsequent national election in 1990, the results of which would have put the military out 
of power, Burma’s military leaders nullified the election and resumed control of the 
 
1George W. Bush, Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Burma (110th Congress, 
2d Session, May 16, 2008) House Document 110-113. 
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country.  Prior to 1988, Burma was ruled by the dictator Ne Win who grabbed power in a 
coup in 1962.  Then as now, Ne Win subjected the people of Burma to harsh treatment in 
order to maintain his grip on power.   
For 47 years, the Burmese have been subjected to authoritarian rule and have 
lived in fear of forced relocation, and violence from military and police actions.  During 
this period, the country’s military rulers have consistently underdeveloped the economy. 
The country has large deposits of natural gas and oil, which have not been tapped to 
benefit the people.  Despite so much natural resource potential, Burma ranks in the “top” 
ten of undeveloped states and has become the second largest producer of illicit opium in 
the world (behind Afghanistan).2  
Burma’s current military leaders have little interest in promoting a legitimate state 
or the well-being of their citizens.  They are instead driven to retain a firm grip on power 
and to increase their personal wealth.  To remain in power they have relied on strong 
internal population control measures, periodically purging the military and intelligence 
services, and recently turning to building ties with powerful neighbors to ensure security 
and expand their wealth and holdings.  The ruling junta seems unconcerned about 
Western diplomacy, economic pressure, or the suffering of its people.  This was made 
evident in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2008.  Following Nargis, the Burmese leaders 
refused aid from Western nations despite an estimated 138,000 Burmese killed or 
missing, and as many as 2.4 million people affected by the cyclone with half that many in 
need of assistance.3  Clearly, the regime was willing to deny access to Western nations 
and sacrifice the well-being of its citizens in order to minimize its exposure to the world, 
and to deny access to Western nations.   
Yet, despite the Burmese government’s fear of Western intrusion, the junta has 
not been totally isolationist.  The government has benefitted from investment and 
business generated by international corporations operating in the country.  The junta has 
 
2 Lianna Sun Wyler, “Burma and Transnational Crime.” Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress  (2008): 4.  
3 IRIN, “Myanmar: UN Reports Improvement in Cyclone Cooperation.” UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, http://www.irinnews.org/ (accessed August 18, 2008). 
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also prioritized expanding trade with rising industrial neighbors, China and India and, in 
the past decade, has even strengthened ties with long time rival Thailand.  Burma joined 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 and thereby expanded 
relations with the more prosperous countries in Southeast Asia.4  All of this suggests that 
Burma sees how it can expand its economy without the West, though the regime’s 
paranoid leaders appear somewhat hesitant to allow large-scale foreign involvement in 
Burma even by non-Westerners.   
Despite the lure of foreign investment from India and China, the junta remains 
centered on its main objective; to maintain internal control.  Burma is ethnically diverse, 
with over 100 languages spoken by a total of 55 million people.  Insurgent movements 
among the ethnic minorities in Burma have been present since the colonial days of British 
rule in the nineteenth century. Ongoing and present-day insurgencies involve both 
minority ethnic groups along the borders and the majority pro-democracy movement 
located in Burma’s populated areas.   
Geographically, Burma is a country with a central river basin opening up to the 
Indian Ocean to the south, and surrounded in horseshoe fashion by hills and mountains 
bordering India and Bangladesh in the west, with China to the north and northeast, and 
Thailand and Laos to the east.  The junta has focused the Burmese Army on quelling the 
numerous insurgencies that have created problems, but never posed a decisive threat to 
the regime.  To weaken these movements, the Burmese government has used various 
techniques from forcefully relocating minority ethnic peoples and destroying their 
villages to brokering cease-fire agreements and offering concessions to insurgent leaders 
in exchange for their cooperation.   
Apart from these insurgencies on the country’s peripheries, the junta has also run 
up against pro-democracy movements demanding free elections and an end to  
authoritarian rule.  Since 1962, several pro-democracy protests have been put down 
harshly by the Army and police, the most recent being the 2007 “Saffron Revolution” by 
Buddhist monks.  The monks were subdued only after hundreds of protestor deaths.  
 
4 Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis; A New Approach to Burma,” Foreign 
Affairs (2007), 149. 
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Historically, Burma’s pro-democracy movements have originated in the larger interior 
cities and have attracted little support from the ethnic groups on the country’s borders. 
The lack of a unified effort between insurgent and pro-democracy movements in Burma 
has eased the government’s efforts to crush its opposition and retain control.  
It might seem hard to imagine given communications today that Burma does not 
feel more threatened by international exposure of its repressive ways.  The Burmese 
government has recognized a need to control the flow of information into and out of the 
country by limiting internet and cell phone use throughout Burma.  However, despite its 
efforts, the junta has had an increasingly difficult time controlling information flows as 
telecommunication technology improves.  During the Saffron Revolution, for instance, 
video imagery captured violence by the military against the protestors.  Burma has been 
reprimanded on numerous occasions by the United Nations for repressive actions.  It is 
no secret that the Burmese Government uses harsh and cruel methods on its people.  Yet, 
beyond announcing sanctions, no outside actors have made moves to dispossess or 
displace the government.   
As one of the world’s top producers of illegal narcotics, Burma may not 
technically pose a direct security threat outside its borders.  Indeed, despite the rhetoric 
used by the U.S. and the UN to call for an end to the junta’s repression and human rights 
abuses, Burma’s sovereignty remains intact.  One of the few actions that could cause this 
to change might be Burma’s pursuit of a nuclear program.  In 2007, Burma and Russia 
signed an intergovernmental cooperation agreement to establish a “nuclear studies” 
center in Burma, which will include a light water-moderated nuclear reactor.5  
Presumably, if Burma goes on to then pursue a nuclear weapons program that could 
“grant” the country a status similar to that of North Korea or Iran, both of which use the 
threat of nuclear weapons development as a bargaining chip when dealing with the 
United States.  Of course, developing a nuclear program could also backfire on Burma, as 
the specter of Burma turning into a nuclear security threat could lead to more direct 
intervention by the U.S.  But for now, Burma has not crossed any thresholds that warrant 
 
5 Paul Kerr, “Russia, Burma Sign Nuclear Agreement,” Arms Control Today, June 2007. 
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direct intervention by any one country.  Paradoxically, because Burma poses no 
immediate direct threat it becomes challenging for critics to develop courses of action, 
apart from sanctions, that might directly affect the regime. 
It is difficult to exert influence on Burma when the rulers continue to line their 
pockets with revenue derived from international corporations operating in the country. 
Businesses, which are motivated by profits, turn a blind eye to atrocities committed by 
the junta.  Burma also is shielded from the full effect of U.S. sanctions by its immediate 
neighbors who are interested in trade and resource exploitation.  Consequently, Burma’s 
rulers have little incentive to change their policies, particularly when they do not need the 
U.S. or the West for protection, trade, or as an outlet for their exports.  
However, this does not mean there are not certain steps the U.S. could take to 
indirectly apply pressure.  This thesis will touch on what these are. Meanwhile, what can 
the U.S. learn from its experience with Burma thus far?  The thesis will explore answers 
to other questions as well. 
Chapter II will provide an overview, to include a brief description of Burma’s 
geography, people, and history focusing on the post-World War II period to the present.  
This chapter will describe how Burma’s geography and settlement patterns have created 
conditions for the separation of ethnic groups and impeded unified efforts by the 
opposition to put pressure on the government to change.  Chapter II will also trace the 
political evolution of Burma after the departure of the British, when Burma briefly 
experienced democracy before the advent of military rule. 
Chapter III will examine the control measures the junta has imposed to thwart 
insurgent efforts and the pro-democracy movements.  Burma’s counterinsurgency 
measures have been effective against multiple insurgent movements and the regime has 
maintained an aggressive program of relocation, intelligence gathering, and human 
trafficking to undermine the insurgents.  This chapter will also look at the government’s 
involvement in the drug trade.    
In Chapter IV, I will examine how the Burmese government has maintained 
national sovereignty despite its repressive policies.  This chapter will consider how the 
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government has tapped into natural resources to build up foreign currency trading with 
countries that overlook human trafficking, human rights abuses, and environmental 
degradation. Chapter IV will discuss Burma’s involvement with multinational 
corporations, its neighbors, the European Union, and ASEAN, and the effect these 
interactions have on Burma’s ability to retain its cruel policies.   
The Conclusion will investigate possible options for the United States.  I will 
describe the sanctions currently in place against Burma and their effect on the junta.  I 
will then consider two variants of engagement.  First, are there incentives the U.S. can 
use to sway the regime toward more moderate policies?  Second, are there any military 
measures that the U.S. would want to use to create reform?  Meanwhile, if regime change 
is possible, what are some of the immediate and long-term challenges a new government 
would face in such an ethnically and politically divided country?   
The thesis will conclude with a set of policy recommendations and a cautionary 
note. 
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II. BURMA OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Burma is a country not in the forefront of international reporting.  The ruling junta 
has intentionally isolated Burma from the world and directed most of its efforts toward 
keeping tight control of its population.  Because of its seclusion, Burma does not receive 
a great deal of notoriety outside of Asia, and therefore the country remains a bit of a 
mystery to Westerners.  This chapter will provide a brief background of Burma’s 
geography, history, and demographics to serve as a backdrop for the topics discussed in 
subsequent chapters.  
B. GEOGRAPHY 
Burma is a country largely shaped by its geography.  In area, it is about the same 
size as France and Belgium combined.6  Situated between India, China, and Thailand, 
Burma covers 240,000 square miles marked by a rugged horseshoe of mountains 
surrounding the central Irrawaddy plain.7  The Irrawaddy River is the largest river in 
Burma, but it is flanked by several other rivers (Sittang, Salween, and Chindwin - which 
drains into the Irrawaddy) which flow south from the mountains, to create a fertile basin 
in the middle of the country prior to emptying into the Indian Ocean. Opening up to the 
Indian Ocean to the south, Burma‘s coastline stretches almost 1200 miles across the Bay 








6 Burma – Geography, http://www.rothwell.force9.co.uk/burmaweb/geography.htm/ (accessed 
February 18, 2009). 
7 Martin Smith, Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change (London: Minority Rights Group 
International, London, 2002), 6. 
  
 
Figure 1.   Map of Burma 
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C. RESOURCES 
Burma has traditionally exported natural resources such as jade and teak and was 
the world’s largest exporter of rice in the early twentieth century.   More recently, oil and 
natural gas have dominated the extracted resources Burma sends abroad. 
D. DEMOGRAPHICS 
The Burmese are mainly Buddhist (89% of the population). The remainder of the 
population is mainly split between Christians (4%) and Muslims (4%) with animists and 
other religions comprising the rest (3%).8  Burma’s rulers generally were of Burman 
ethnicity and divisions between Burmans and minority groups have existed throughout 
the country’s history. With a population of close to 52 million people, Burma is one of 
the poorest nations in Asia despite its wealth of natural resources.9    
E. STATES, DIVISIONS, CAPITAL  
Burma is divided into states and divisions per the 1974 Constitution.  The seven 
states – Kachin, Sagaing, Chin, Rakhine, Shan, Kayin, and Mon – are inhabited by the 
larger minority ethnic groups and occupy the Burmese border to the west, north, and east.  
These states are generally in the hilly and mountainous areas and are difficult to access, 
which is one reason why the Burmese Government has struggled to keep tight control on 
the states’ ethnic inhabitants.  The seven divisions (largely inhabited by Burmans) are 
Yangoon, Ayeyarwady, Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Tanintharyi, and Sagaing.10 These 
divisions are located in the interior of the country where the government exerts and can 
exert greater control over the population.   
The capital of Burma until 2007 was Rangoon. In 2007, the ruling junta 
constructed a heavily fortified and isolated capital area farther into the interior of the 
 
8 US State Department, “Burma,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm/ (accessed March 1, 
2009). 
9 CIA, “The World Fact Book-Burma,” http:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/bm.html/ (accessed February 19, 2009). 
10 The terms “Burman” and “Burmese” are used in their traditional British context.  “Burman” refers 
to the majority ethnic group in the country while the term “Burmese” refers to all peoples of the country of 
Burma.  “Burmese,” however, is also the language spoken by the “Burman” ethnic group. 
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country, at Naypyidaw near the township of Pyinmana. The geographic division of the 
country and relocation of the capital highlight some of the core problems facing the 
modern Burmese.  Namely, that Burma is a nation that is sharply divided along ethnic 
lines and ruled by a self-serving and paranoid military junta. 
F. ETHNIC GROUPS 
The complexity of life in Burma is reflected in its ethnic divisions which have 
long impacted politics in Burma.  The majority Burman ethnic group makes up almost 
two-thirds of the population.  The predominant minority ethnic groups consist of the 
Mon, Shan, Rakhine, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, and the Chin who occupy the periphery 
states of the country.  The ethnic groups described below are not all the ethnic groups 
there are in Burma.  Many sub-ethnic groups exist within the larger ethnic groups, and 
the ethnic groups are also not as cleanly divided as are the states.  Portions of ethnic 
groups have been absorbed into other ethnic groups.  The descriptions below pertain to 
the groups most easily identified. 
1. Burman 
The Burmans descended onto the Irrawaddy plain from the mountainous areas of 
modern day Tibet and established the first kingdoms as city-states.  The Burmans initially 
conquered the Mon, who were the earliest people to settle in Burma.  Under their king, 
Anawratha, the Burmans adopted Theravada Buddhism in the eleventh century and 
despite Anawratha’s attempts to stamp out animism, beliefs in nat or spirits continue 
today (adherence to these beliefs is common in Burma and superstitions have influenced 
policies enacted by the country’s leadership).11  Although the Burmans have formed 
alliances with some of the other groups in Burma out of necessity in the past, for the past 
millennium they have been unable to unite the separate ethnic groups in Burma.   
The Burmans have consistently resisted outside influence in Burma.  When Indian 
immigrants flocked to Burma to farm rice as cultivation and production grew under the 
 
11 Robert I. Rotberg, Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998): 13. 
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British, the Burmans, following independence, pressured Indians to leave the country.12 
The current ruling junta claims unity exists among Burma’s ethnic groups, but, in reality, 
the Burman-dominated government has tirelessly worked to undermine the power base of 
other groups.  Through state sponsored education, the Burmans have promoted Burmese 
as the national language and infused their version of history and culture nationwide. 
2. Mon 
The Mon were the earliest settlers on the Irrawaddy Plain.  The Mon had 
extensive and early impacts not only in Southern Burma, but also in Thailand, and they 
are linguistically related to the Khmer in Cambodia.13  The Mon brought Buddhism to 
Burma, which was adopted by the Burmans.  The Mon kings originally ruled over much 
of lower Burma, but struggled for power with the Burmans from the time of the latter’s 
arrival in the ninth century.  Following the capture of Pegu by Alaungpaya in the 
eighteenth century, the visibility of the Mon culture and territory declined. 14  Also, after 
defeat at the hands of the Burmans, many Mon fled to Thailand from where Burma’s 
contemporary Mon draw support.   
Following Burma’s independence from the British in 1948, some Mon formed the 
insurgent Mon National Defense Organization (MNDO) devoted to the establishment of 
an independent country. 15 The MNDO was followed by the Mon United Front and the 
New Mon State party.16 The Mon are still actively resisting the present government, but 
they are small in number and pose only a minor threat to the ruling junta.  The Mon 
reside mainly along the coast of the Andaman Sea in the Southeastern part of the country. 
Mon leaders claim a present-day population of over 4 million, but only around 1 million 
Mon-speakers are officially identified by that name.17  
 
12 David I. Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma (Norwalk: Eastbridge, 2006), 236. 
13 Ibid., 64.  
14 Martin Smith, Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change, 17. 
15 George A. Theodorson, “Minority Peoples in the Union of Burma,” Journal of Southeast Asian 
History (1995) 11-12. 
16 Ibid., 12. 
17 Ibid. 
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3. Karen 
The Karen are the largest ethnic minority group in Burma and their politics are the 
most complex of any of Burma’s ethnic groups in Burma.18 The Karen State lies in the 
southeastern portion of Burma bordering Thailand to the east.  The term ‘Karen’ refers to 
20 subgroups of Karen-speaking peoples who come from diverse religious, cultural, and 
geographical backgrounds.19  The two dominant subgroups are the Sgaw, who are mainly 
Christian and occupy the hill area of the Karen State, and the Pwo, who are Buddhist and 
live in the lowlands.  Large numbers of Karen live outside of the Karen State in the 
Irrawaddy Delta area and in the Tanintharyi (Tenassarim) Division, with a substantial 
Karen population also residing in Rangoon and the surrounding area.   
Throughout their history, the Karen have been dominated by their more powerful 
neighbors, the Burmans, the Mon, and the Siamese (Thais).  In the nineteenth century, 
Baptist missionaries converted many of the Karen from animism to Christianity.  This 
conversion had a long lasting effect as the Karen began to assert their influence in the 
region.  The Karen sided with the British in their wars with the Burman,s which created 
lasting resentment among the Burman majority.  In retaliation for aiding the British in the 
Second Anglo-Burman War, for instance, the Burmans burned every Karen village within 
a fifty-mile radius of Rangoon.20  
The Karen acceptance of Western education led to large numbers of Karen 
assuming positions of prominence in British Burma’s administration.  At the beginning of 
World War II, the Karen remained loyal to the British and when the Japanese took 
control of the country, the Burma Independence Army (BIA) took hostage and brutally 
executed almost two thousand Karen civilians.21  The Karen fought alongside the British 
and Americans when they retook Burma from the Japanese and the Karen expected to 
gain their own independent state from the British in return for their loyalty. These 
expectations were short lived, however.  
 
18 Martin Smith, Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change, 16. 
19 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends, 
Policy Study 45 (Southeast Asia) (Washington D.C.: East-West Center, 2008) 3. 
20 Theodorson, Minority Peoples, 3. 
21 Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma, 5. 
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When the Burman-dominated government under U Nu took power in 1948, the 
animosity that existed between the Burmans and the Karen led to a constitution in which 
the Karen were not afforded the right to secede (a right that was granted to the Shan and 
the Karenni).  The government, made up largely of members of the Burman Anti-Fascist 
People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), demanded that the Karen National Union (KNU), 
the largest Karen political party, and members of its armed force, the Karen National 
Defense Organization (KNDO), turn in their weapons.   
In 1949, shortly after Karen soldiers in the government army mutinied, the Karen 
under the KNU’s political leadership launched a rebellion directed at the Burman-
dominated government. The Karen insurgency has been ongoing for decades now. When 
peace talks between the Burmese Government and the KNU broke down in 1995-6,  
fighting quickly resumed.22 In recent years, the government has applied harsh measures 
against the Karen and forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of them.  Many have fled 
across the Thai border where they occupy refugee camps while others have relocated in 
the hill areas on the eastern border.  There appears to be no end to the struggle in sight.  
4. Shan 
The Shan make up the second largest ethnic minority group in Burma, comprising 
about 6% of the overall population.23  The Shan State is located in a mountainous area in 
northeastern Burma bordering China, Laos, and Thailand.  The Shan, like the Thais and 
Laotians, originated in China and the Shan native language is Thai.  The Shan migrated 
into northeastern Burma from the Nanchao Kingdom in Yunnan. Their migration greatly 
accelerated when the Nanchao Kingdom was conquered by Kublai Khan in 1253.24  
After Kublai Khan destroyed the Burman capital at Pagan in 1287, the Shan sacked the 
city-state in 1299, and dominated Burma until the sixteenth century
Shan rule was marked by a great deal of in-fighting, much of which revolved 
around the Shan feudal political system built around sawbwas, a type of principality.  
 
22 Martin Smith, Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change, 16. 
23 Ibid., 4. 
24 Theodorson, Minority Peoples, 5. 
25 Ibid. 
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After Shan power declined in the sixteenth century, the Shan maintained independence 
from the Burmans only to ally with the Burmans in the face of foreign invaders.  When 
the British colonized Burma, they allowed the Shan to maintain their sawbwas, which the 
British taxed.  After independence, the Shan States joined the Union of Burma with the 
promise that they could secede in ten years if they so desired.26  When the Burmese 
government attempted to weaken the sawbwas and withdrew the promise of secession, 
the Shan revolted in 1959 in order to form an independent nation.  The Shan pushed for 
federalization of the minority states in Burma but their initiative was squashed by Ne Win 
and his military government when he took power in 1962. 
The Shan have since maintained an insurgency against the Burmese government. 
The largest of their armed groups is the Shan State Army (SSA).  The United Wa State 
Army (UWSA), was described by one U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency official in 2002 as 
“the dominant heroin trafficking group in Southeast Asia, and perhaps the world.”27  
Smaller groups, such as the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) and the Shan 
United Army (SUA) merged over time to form the 15,000-strong Mong Tai Army 
(MTA).  Like the UWSA, the MTA became a major narco-trafficker but surrendered to 
the SLORC in 1996. 
The Burmese Army imposed its Four Cuts policy (see Chapter III) on the Shan 
state between 1996 and 1998, ordering 300,000 Shan from 1,400 villages to leave their 
homes.28 The Shan insurgency continues to the present day. 
5. Kachin 
The Kachin are also Tibeto-Burman descendents and migrated around 700 A.D. 
to settle in the northern mountains of Burma.29  In doing so, they drove the Chin, Shan, 
and Palaung out of the northern area of Burma.  Although Kachin make up only a small 
 
26 Theodorson, Minority Peoples, 6. 
 27 Dan Murphy "Burmese Drugs Fuel Regional Strife; Under a Cloud of Drug Suspicion: Burma 
Accused Thailand of Supporting 'Terrorist' Groups on Friday,” The Christian Science Monitor (2002):  
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed February 4, 2009). 
28 Christina Fink, Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule (Bangkok: White Lotus Company Ltd. 
2001) 125. 
29 John F. Cady, The United States and Burma (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) 8. 
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portion of the population of Burma (1.5 million, 2%), the Kachin State is large and 
second in size only to the Shan State.30  Kachin are predominantly Christian, the result of 
Baptist and Christian missionary work and have a reputation for being fierce fighters.31 
Because of their tenacity, they were heavily recruited by the British to serve in the British 
Burmese Army.  Thanks to their reputation as warriors and given the hilly nature of their 
terrain, outsiders mostly left the Kachin alone to raid and tax caravans passing between 
Burma and China. While the Burmans and Shan welcomed the Japanese during World 
War II, the Kachin and Karen resisted the invasion and worked with the British and 
Americans in their unconventional warfare campaigns against the occupiers.  
The Kachin State was created at independence in 1948 on the condition that the 
Kachin give up claims to the right of secession.32  In 1961, following U Nu’s push to 
make Buddhism the state religion, the Kachin reacted by forming the Kachin 
Independence Organization (KIO).  The Kachin State became a major site of insurgency 
and between 1961 and 1986 several tens of thousands of Kachin were estimated to have 
been killed, and over 100,000 Kachin villagers were forcibly displaced by the Burmese 
Army.33  During this same period, the narcotics trade became a main source of revenue 
for the Kachin. 34  
The Kachin agreed to a cease-fire with the Burmese Government in 1994. The 
Burmese Army occupied portions of the Kachin State leading to a rise in narcotics 
trafficking in the state.35   
6. Rakhine (Arakanese) 
Burma’s Rakhine State lies in the western part of the country bordering 
Bangladesh and is adjacent to the Bay of Bengal to the west.  Originally known as 
 
30 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999) 
30. 
31 Ibid., 45. 
32 Martin Smith, Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change, 16. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Rotberg, Burma, 189. The Kachin reversed their narcotics policy in the late 1980s and developed 
measures against opium cultivation after their leadership saw addiction rates rise in the Kachin State.   
35 Ibid. 
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Arakan, the Rakhine State is separated by mountains from the central plains of Burma 
and, because of this divide, the Arakanese were able to maintain their independence from 
Burma until the late eighteenth century.36  Two major ethnic groups, the Rakhine 
(Buddhist) and the Rohingya (Muslims), inhabit the Rakhine State with an unofficial 
population of 5 million, of where approximately 1.5 million are Rohingya.  37 Early 
Muslim settlements in Arakan date back to the seventh century AD and after the 
conversion of King Narameikhla to Islam in 1404, Arakan became a majority Muslim 
kingdom. 38   
Buddhist influence grew in Arakan. In 1785, the Burman king Bodapaya 
conquered Arakan and the independent kingdom now came under Burman influence.  In 
1824, the British East India Company gained control of Arakan following the First 
Anglo-Burmese War.  The British did not attempt to unify the Arakanese with the other 
Burmese ethnic groups and Arakan came increasingly under Indian influence.  Prior to 
independence in 1947, General Aung San proposed not all states should receive regional 
autonomy with the provision of being able to secede after ten years. 39 With the death of 
Aung San and U Nu’s declaration of Buddhism as the state religion, the Arakan Muslims 
quickly became alienated.   
Persecution of the Rohingya continues and the Burmese Government has moved 
non-Muslims into the Rakhine State to dampen the Muslim influence.  In reaction, low 
level insurgent movements have developed along the Bangladesh border, and the 
Burmese government has implemented severe control measures on the Muslim 
population.  The Rohingya, for the most part, do not possess Burmese citizenship and 
their rights are much more restricted than those of the Rakhine. Since the military 
takeover of Burma, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have fled over the Bangladesh 
border and crowded Rohingya refugee camps exist just inside Bangladesh.     
 
36 Theodorson, Minority Peoples, 12. 
37 Syed Serajul Islam, “State Terrorism in Arakan,” in A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in 
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38 Ibid., 327. 
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7. Chin 
The Chin State is located in the mountainous northwest portion of Burma on the 
Assam, India-Bangladesh border.  Constituting over 40 dialect sub-groups, the Chin are 
the most diverse ethnic nationality in Burma and their population is an estimated 1.5 
million. 40 Many Chin move back and forth between India and Burma. Descended from 
Tibetan tribes, the Chin were animists and preliterate before the arrival of Western 
missionaries who converted many to Christianity.41   
Under the British, the Chin were not granted independence and remained under 
the rule of the Burman kings; the Chin did not mount an insurgency following 
independence as did so many of the other minority ethnic groups.  The situation for the 
Chin changed dramatically following the 1988 pro-democracy protests, when many Chin 
students went underground and formed the Chin National Front. 42 Fighting has grown 
since the Burmese Army crackdown and many Chin have fled across the Indian border.   
All political parties in the Chin State have been banned by the ruling junta and the 
army has resorted to forced labor and even supposedly encouraged soldiers to marry Chin 
girls in order to infiltrate their families and villages.  There have been further reports of 
discrimination by the government against Chin Christians, including restrictions on the 
building of churches and harassment of local pastors. 43  The government has imprisoned 
several Chin leaders for protesting government policies and there appears to be no let up 
on repression. 
8. Karenni 
The Kayah State, home of the Karenni, is sandwiched between the Shan State to 
the north and the Karen State to the south on Burma’s eastern border with Thailand.  
Karenni (‘Red Karen’) is the collective name for a dozen Karen-speaking groups; the 
name comes from the traditional color of the clothing of the largest sub-group, the 
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Kayah.44 The majority of Karenni are Christian, mostly Baptist and Catholic.  In a 
country that is overwhelmingly Buddhist, it seems logical for the Christian minority to 
stay united. However, the Christians in the Kayah State have let disagreements separate 
them from the Baptist Karenni.45 The Burmese Government has attempted to use this 
divide to drive a wedge between the Christian subgroups to weaken their resolve.   
The Karenni have a reputation as superb fighters dating back to the seventeenth 
century when they attained their independence from both Thai and Burman rulers.46  The 
British under colonization never annexed the then-Karenni State (the government 
changed the name to Kayah State in 1951) and Kayah State, like most others, was granted 
the right to secede (after ten years) under the 1947 Burmese Constitution.   
The Karenni have resisted capitulating to the Burmese Government continuously 
since World War II. But the leading Karenni opposition groups, the Karenni National 
Progressive Party (KNPP), the left-wing Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front 
(KNPLF), and the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) have also suffered from in-fighting. 
This has helped the Burmese Government to keep the groups apart.  The Kayah State, 
while possessing Burma’s most important hydro-electric plant and valuable mineral 
reserves, has some of the poorest educational and health indicators of any part of the 
country. 47 The Karenni have also suffered displacement of their population by the junta, 
and thousands of Karenni refugees reside on the Thai side of the border with Burma. 
9. Chinese and Indians 
Burma is home to large Chinese and Indian populations.  While not recognized by 
the Government of Burma as separate ethnic minorities (or ‘national races’), and though 
they don’t live in designated states, Burma’s resident Chinese and Indians were 
influential during British rule and during the rise of the Communist Party of Burma 
(CPB).  The Indian population is estimated to exceed one million and most live in 
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Western Burma in the Rakhine State.  However, the Indian population is much smaller 
than it could potentially have been.  In the 1930s, deliberate anti-Indian violence directed 
at the Indians who migrated to Burma to farm rice resulted in 500,000 Indians fleeing 
Burma. Following Ne Win’s 1962 coup, another 300,000 returned to India.  
The Chinese population in Burma is around half a million and the Chinese reside 
mainly in the states bordering China. 48  The Chinese have been linked to the CPB in the   
twentieth century and more recently, the Burmese have viewed the Chinese as rivals in 
business.  Like the Indians, the Chinese also fled en masse following the Ne Win coup.  
Both the Chinese and the Indian populations in Burma continue to face discrimination 
under the 1982 Citizenship Law that limits “non-citizens” from education benefits, 
owning property, and holding public office.49  Anti-Chinese and anti-Indian sentiment 
remains strong in Burma despite the strengthening of relations between Burma and both 
countries. 
G. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. Bagan, Taungoo, Konbaung Kingdoms  
Burma has only been ‘unified’ at three points in its history.  First, in the eleventh 
century, the Bagan Dynasty established centralized rule. Today, looking back this is 
considered the “Golden Age.”50 It was in this time period that Therevada Buddhism 
made its first appearance, and the Bagan ruled from 1044 until the thirteenth century 
when Mongol invaders destroyed the Bagan capitol in the Irrawaddy River Delta.  
In the fifteenth century, Burma was again unified, this time under the Taungoo 
Dynasty, which lasted until the eighteenth century when it was defeated by, the Shan. 
The final Burman royal dynasty, the Konbaung, was established in 1752 under the rule of 
King Alaungpaya and lasted until the fall of King Thibaw to the British in 1885.   
 




                                                
As the Konbaung (1752-1885) expanded westward in the 1820s, eventually 
conquering Assam, the British East India Company reacted.51 In 1824, the armies of the 
Burmese king and the English East India Company fought the longest and most 
expensive war in British Indian history.52  This initial war, dubbed the First Anglo-
Burman War, was followed by the Second (1852-3) and Third Anglo-Burman (1885) 
Wars.  The third and final war began with a dispute over teak concessions, but was 
actually a reaction by the British to French ambitions to expand into Burma as part of 
their Southeast Asia colonization strategy.53  The Third Anglo-Burman War ended the 
rule of the last Burman King Thibaw and began Britain’s colonization of Burma.  The 
lead up to British colonization was marked by rising conflict in Burma between the 
Burman monarchy and the minority ethnic groups.   
Throughout the reign of the Konbaung, the Mon and Karen resisted their Burman 
rulers and aided the British during their three wars waged against the Konbaung.  A 
formidable Shan rebellion broke out in 1883, and the Kachin invaded Upper Burma in 
force in 1884-1885.54 As already mentioned, tension between the Burmans and the ethnic 
minorities persists to the present day.   
British colonization of Burma had similarly long lasting effects which have 
carried over into modern Burma.  When the British colonized Burma, they did so as an 
extension of their rule in India and governed Burma through Indian colonial 
administrators.  
2. British Colonization 
Under British rule, Burma experienced significant changes.  The British rejected 
Burman Buddhist laws and replaced them with an administrative system that functioned 
under permanent lines of authority, radiating from the center to the colony’s borders.55  
 
51 US State Department, “Burma,”  1. 
51 Ibid., 111-112. 
52 Ibid., 113. 
53 John F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1958) 118-119. 
54 Ibid., 116. 
55 Rotberg, Burma 17. 
 21
                                                
The Burman monastic education system was eventually replaced by missionary and state 
education designed to marginalize the Buddhist monks.  Along with replacing the 
Burman king with a foreign governor, the British set up a permanent hierarchy and 
brought in well-educated and trained administrators, who served throughout the land.  
The military and police in Burma were led by Britons, but staffed by Indians and ethnic 
minorities, further shifting the balance of power from the Burmans to minorities and 
foreigners.56  The British furthered the divide between the Burmans and the ethnic 
minorities by implementing indirect rule in the hill areas.   
Overall, the colonial system introduced liberal democracy to the Burmans, and 
Burman society moved in two general directions. The urban elites pushed for 
independence based on constitutional government while the rural population desired a 
return to traditional values from the pre-colonial period.  This kept the minorities not only 
separated from the Burmans, but separated from each other. 
3. World War II – Japanese Occupation 
These latent divides came to the fore when the Japanese invaded Burma in 1942.  
In their original war plans, the Japanese did not intend to invade Burma, but reconsidered 
after they thought they could bring the war in China to a close by cutting off the Burma 
Road.57  Also, Burma provided Japan with much needed raw materials to support its war 
effort, while Japanese used Burman agents to provide information about the status of the 
British defenses prior to invasion.  Aung San, who avoided arrest in Burma for 
subversion and fled to Japan, organized from within Burma the “Thirty Comrades.” 
These were Burman allies who aided the Japanese in their invasion of Burma. Many of 
the members of the Thirty Comrades came to political prominence following the war, to 
include  future  dictator  Ne  Win.   On December 8, 1941,  the  day  following  the  Pearl  
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Harbor attack, the Japanese brought the Thirty Comrades to Bangkok to finalize war 
plans and, at this meeting, the Burma Independence Army (BIA) was officially 
established.58  
The Japanese routed the Chinese and British forces defending Burma who 
retreated into China and India. In the wake of the British retreat, the largely Burman BIA, 
which distinguished itself initially in battle, degenerated into an armed mob. The severity 
of ethnic violence it engaged in surprised even the Japanese.59  The Karen, Karenni, and 
Kachin, who remained loyal to the British and fought with the allies to retake Burma, 
were brutalized by both the BIA and the Japanese.  However, the Japanese also 
mistreated their Burman allies, subjecting them to forced labor to rebuild an 
infrastructure largely destroyed by the retreating British.60 As a consequence, Aung San 
eventually turned the BIA against the Japanese and fought to expel the invaders.   
In the aftermath of the fighting, with the British weakened from the war, her 
reassertion of control lacked the vigor they possessed prior to the war.  Inter-ethnic 
fighting which pitted the Karen, Karenni, and Kachin against the Burmans and Shan, as 
well as internal fighting between the Rakhine and Rohingya, created deep scars in the 
collective Burmese psyche leading to the Burmese conviction that (to this day)‘World 
War II continues in Burma.’61 
4. United States, British, And Burmese Allies 
During World War II, the United States fought both conventional and 
unconventional wars in Burma against the Japanese and her clients.   Initially driven out 
of the country by the invading Japanese, General Joseph Stilwell, in charge of the China 
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Burma India (CBI) Theater forces, prepared United States, British and Chinese forces to 
re-invade Burma and drive out the Japanese.  The United States Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) organized a force and deployed it to Assam to conduct sabotage behind 
Japanese lines in Burma.  The OSS’s Detachment 101 quickly transitioned from direct 
action sabotage missions to raising, equipping, training, and employing Kachin recruits 
for guerrilla warfare against the Japanese and their Burman counterparts.   
The Allies eventually drove the Japanese out of Burma. Despite the bonds forged 
between the Americans and Kachin during the war, the U.S. was in no position to aid the 
Kachin in any way beyond the war as the British re-established colonial control. 
5. Independence 
When World War II ended, the British sought to rebuild the economy of Burma 
while taking steps to advance Burma to full membership in the British Commonwealth.62 
The British realized independence was inevitable, but felt the Burmese were not ready to 
govern themselves politically, socially, or economically.  Aung San, who helped build up 
the BNA, which was the foundation of the modern Burmese military (the Tatmadaw) 
became Burma’s wartime leader and emerged from the war as the de facto leader of the 
Burmese.  Despite emphatic warnings from Winston Churchill and others about the 
reckless nature of the colony’s drive toward freedom, the British government seemed 
ready to work with Aung San and his party, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League 
(AFPFL).63  
Prior to the war, the British governed the Irrawaddy Delta Region separately from 
the hill areas. At the time, the British did not believe the ethnic minorities were politically 
ready to integrate with the Burmans.  After World War II, the Karen expected the British 
to grant them  independence  due to their unwavering support and historic enmity  toward  
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the Burmans.  The British advocated that no decision on independence would be made 
without the consent of the people from the Frontier Area.  Aung San echoed this view 
and supported autonomy for the hill people.   
In January 1947, Aung San and the leaders of the APFPL were called to London 
where they entered into an agreement with the British government outlining the steps to 
be taken to achieve independence.64  Upon his return to Burma, Aung San held a 
conference at Panglong with Shan, Kachin, and Chin representatives to discuss terms of a 
future union with independent Burma.  The ethnic representatives and Aung San all 
agreed to work together for independence, Aung San promised the minorities that they 
could participate in the interim government he was heading, and he told them that they 
would enjoy equality and autonomy.65 Aung San never lived to see the agreement come 
to fruition, however; he was assassinated in July 1947 by a rival political opponent.  The 
agreement at Panglong is significant because of the autonomy and equality spelled out for 
the ethnic minorities, which is still claimed by the minority groups today as owed to them 
by the government.   
Unfortunately, the 1947 constitution produced a flawed union of the minorities 
with the Burman majority.  The constitution granted two ethnic groups, the Shan and 
Karenni, the right to secede after 10 years while the other ethnic groups were not afforded 
this opportunity.  Also significant in the constitution were statements that all states were 
dependent on the central government and the Prime Minister had the right to name the 
head of state of the minority states.66  The inequities in the constitution received 
immediate response from the minority states, with the Karen refusing the state given to 
them.  To compensate for the inequalities, the AFPFL chose a Shan for the country’s first 
president and allowed a Karen to head the army.67   
Prior to World War II, the communists in Burma had begun to gather strength and 
they aligned themselves with Aung San, the APFPL, and the army to fight off the 
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Japanese.  However, Aung San expelled the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) from 
Burma prior to the signing of the constitution and the CPB rebelled.    
Thus, when Burma became an independent nation in January 1948, it had 
incompletely defined states, dissatisfaction over the inequality of the 
states, a minority preparing to defend its people against the Burman 
majority and a communist party preparing for revolution.68 
 
The modern nation of Burma became independent on January 4, 1948 at 4:20 AM with 
the specific time chosen by Burmese astrologers as the most propitious for the country’s 
new beginning.69 The AFPFL took power with U Nu accepting duties as the country’s 
first prime minister.  
6. Burma’s Initial Independent Government 
The Burmese entered independence with high expectations for freedom and 
prosperity.  However, Burma’s leaders faced enormous challenges.  Burma lacked trained 
civil administrators because the British employed foreign civil servants – Indians mostly - 
to run the country during the colonial period.  The communists, formerly part of the 
AFPFL had broken away, gone underground, and were attempting to mobilize support of 
the population for land reform.  The armed People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO) 
which had been set up by Aung San for World War II veterans, also turned into an 
insurgent group.70  In the face of these threats, the Tatmadaw was weakened by 
defections; first, by all-Burman units to the CPB and second, by all-Karen units to the 
Karen.71   
In response, General Ne Win, a Burman and one of the Thirty Comrades, replaced 
the Karen commander of the Tatmadaw and reorganized the army by placing Burman 
officers in charge of all of the Tatmadaw’s units.  Ne Win began to build up the 
Tatmadaw and subsequently drove the insurrectionists out of the Irrawaddy Plain, relying 
on harsh tactics and martial law to subdue his opponents.  After Mao’s takeover of China 
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in 1949, the Tatmadaw also had to contend with communist Chinese troops as well as the 
nationalist Chinese Kuomintang (covertly sponsored by the United States) that had fled 
from the Red Army into northern Burma.  The Tatmadaw entered the Shan State to expel 
the Kuomintang, but in doing so mistreated the local Shan population stirring further 
resentment towards the Burman-dominated army and government.   
In an effort to lift all portions of Burmese society, the Government of Burma 
launched social programs in the 1950’s to provide free public education and also 
implemented land reform to redistribute land which had been occupied by foreigners and 
absentee landlords.72  However, the government’s good intentions fell short upon 
implementation and many of its socialist goals went unfulfilled.  U Nu further alienated 
certain ethnic minorities when he brought Buddhism to the fore of his political agenda.   
As 1958 approached, the Shan and Karenni looked to exercise their constitutional 
right to secede from Burma.  Military officers voiced their dissatisfaction with these 
potential secessions, and in response in 1958, U Nu announced that Senior General Ne 
Win would form a caretaker government.73  Ne Win’s caretaker government offered a 
glimpse of the future for Burma.  Squatter communities had sprung up in the capital of 
Rangoon, causing disruption to daily life and unsanitary conditions.  Ne Win on short 
notice moved the squatters to satellite towns that were unprepared for the influx of 
transients.  The caretaker government responded negatively to criticism by the press and 
imprisoned journalists for challenging its policies.  Ne Win extended the caretaker 
government twice beyond its original six-month charter expired, but finally acquiesced to 
pressure for national elections which were held in 1960. 
7. Ne Win’s Coup 
Approaching the elections, U Nu’s Buddhist leanings made him a popular 
candidate among the majority Buddhist population, and his Union Party, (reorganized 
from the AFPFL) won a landslide victory.  Immediately, U Nu came under fire from 
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minority groups for their perceived neglect by his government.  When U Nu pushed 
through a constitutional amendment making Buddhism the national religion of Burma, 
minority groups again began a push for secession.74  In March of 1962, during a high-
level seminar attended by U Nu and senior Shan representatives concerning federal 
issues, Ne Win again seized power and arrested U Nu, members of his government, and 
many Shan leaders.75  
Several different reasons are offered for Ne Win’s coup: that Ne Win and the 
Tatmadaw wanted to return to the position of power they experienced as the caretaker 
government in 1958; concern that U Nu’s sympathy for the ethnic minorities was eroding 
the Union of Burma; or perhaps, most compelling, that U Nu and the ethnic minorities 
were increasingly critical of the Tatmadaw and their heavy-handed ways of dealing with 
the insurgents and minority groups.76 What was clearly evident at the time of the 1962 
coup was that the Tatmadaw, built up from the original BIA, was a well organized 
formidable force, loyal to Ne Win. It planned and executed a coup throughout the country 
with no question about who was in control.   
8. Ne Win’s Government 
Ne Win’s first priority after re-taking office was to establish control over the 
country.  Shortly after the beginning of the new school year in June 1962, student protests 
began (at the University of Rangoon) in reaction to a revised school policy that called for 
dismissing any student who failed an exam three consecutive times.  The protests turned 
into riots, and when police could not stop the student violence, Ne Win sent in the army, 
which ended the riots by firing into the crowd, killing scores of students and wounding 
hundreds more.  When students continued to protest by posting placards on the walls of 
the student union with insults leveled at Ne Win and his estranged wife, the general 
authorized the building’s total destruction.77  
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Ne Win and his Revolutionary Council of advisors set out to reform Burmese 
politics and society.  They started by replacing approximately 2,000 civilian members of 
the country’s administration with military personnel.78  The Revolutionary Council 
instituted what it called ‘the Burmese Way to Socialism,’ a program to socialize the 
country and distribute wealth across the nation.79  The Revolutionary Council 
nationalized banks, industries, and large shops.  Burmese currency (50-kyat and 100-kyat 
notes) was demonetized with the intention of depriving foreign capitalists of wealth, 
which drove thousands of Indians and Chinese out of the country when they lost 
everything.80 Ne Win’s policies began a state of Burmese isolationism that continues 
today.   
Ne Win’s socialist policies were a disaster for Burma.  When the Revolutionary 
Council redistributed land to landless farmers and then forced them to sell their rice to the 
government at far below market prices, the farmers put little effort into cultivating rice 
for the state and many turned to the black market instead.  As military men were brought 
in to take over businesses and industries, the enterprises suffered greatly and many 
educated and trained civilians fled the country in search of better opportunities.    Burma, 
which in the 1930s was the leading exporter of rice in the world, became a rice importer 
under Ne Win’s regime.   
Under Ne Win’s reign, only one political party was recognized: the Burma 
Socialist Program Party (BSPP). This was a party founded by Ne Win and its focus was 
to further implement socialist policies under the tight control of the military.  The regime 
kept tight control on the Burman population, while focusing the military on 
counterinsurgency operations against ethnic minority rebels and communist insurgents 
alike.  The Tatmadaw counterinsurgency operations were aided by the fact that the ethnic 
minorities fought as individual forces and did not consolidate their efforts.   
In 1976, a new phase in the civil war began when eight minority groups led by the 
Karen, Bo Mya, joined together to form the National Democratic Front (NDF) made up 
 




                                                
of Karen, Arakanese, Kachin, Karenni, Lahus, Palaungs, Shan, and Pa-Os.81  The goal of 
the organization was to unite the military forces of the ethnic groups to collectively fight 
the Tatmadaw.  The NDF, however, did not initially have any precise political goals and 
did not integrate the communists into the organization, which weakened its military 
capability.  Although the NDF failed to achieve its military objectives, the groups did 
come to an agreement to work toward a future federation based on equality, autonomy, 
liberty, and self-determination.82   
9. Ne Win Steps Down 
Ne Win’s socialism, which was a mask for his authoritarianism, drove the 
economy and standard of living well below what it had been at the beginning of his reign.  
The xenophobia and isolationism characteristic of the BSPP and the Revolutionary 
Council are his other enduring legacy; they remain intact in Burma’s dealings with 
Western powers today.  With the economy in a shambles, the Burmese dictator officially 
called a special meeting of the BSPP on July 23, 1988, where he outlined an initiative for 
a multi-party system in Burma, and he announced his resignation as party leader.83  In his 
final speech as leader of the BSPP, Ne Win called for an end to socialism in Burma and 
advocated allowing private business and industry to return.   
Ne Win’s proposal was rejected by the BSSP, but his resignation was accepted 
and, three days later, the party chose Sein Lwin as its leader and the new head of state.84  
Sein Lwin, known as “the Butcher,” served under Ne Win in World War II and, despite 
very little education, rose to the top of the BSPP mainly through his ruthlessness and 
willingness to use extreme force to put down protests and resistance. 
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10. National Democracy Movement and the Rise of the SLORC 
Soon after Sein Lwin’s installment, protests began nationwide on August 8, 
1988.85 Despite Ne Win’s warnings against using the Tatmadaw to violently put down 
the protests, Sein Lwin instituted martial law and ordered the army to fire on crowds in 
Rangoon and Mandalay.  The protesters ranged from dockworkers to university students 
to monks, and the protests occurred simultaneously across the country, not only in the 
large cities, but in small villages and even in the minority states.  Surprisingly, Sein Lwin 
resigned on August 12 and his successor, Dr. Maung Maung, called for an end to martial 
law and the release of all political prisoners.   
At the same time, U Nu began a push to reclaim his position as the country’s 
prime minister, a new and influential opposition leader appeared. Aung San Suu Kyi, the 
daughter of General Aung San called for moderation and the peaceful transfer of 
power.86   The BSPP announced it would allow a multi-party parliament and hold a 
national election.  But the protestors were leery of the BSPP’s promise and the protests 
continued.   
On September 18, 1988, the military staged a coup and seized power from the 
BSPP.  The Tatmadaw began dismantling the protestors’ barricades and anyone who 
resisted was shot.  The new ruling military junta called itself the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC) and its new chairman was General Saw Maung (although 
many believed Ne Win was in control of the SLORC behind the scenes). 87 Evidence that 
the protests did have an impact on the new ruling junta can be seen in its 1989 
announcement that elections would be held in May 1990; ideally that would buy enough 
time for the SLORC to influence the elections in its favor.   
Political parties sprang up all over Burma, but the most significant was the 
National League for Democracy (NLD) with Aung San Suu Kyi as its leader.  The 
government began a smear campaign to discredit Aung San Suu Kyi, highlighting her 
marriage to an Englishman to play on Burmese xenophobia. As the daughter of Burma’s 
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national hero, her popularity remained high.  The SLORC placed her under house arrest 
prior to the elections.  The elections were held and the NLD won 392 of 485 
parliamentary votes while the military-backed National Unity Party (NUP) won only 10 
seats.88  The SLORC employed delaying tactics after the election and attempted to de-
legitimize the results.89  
11. SLORC Policies 
By separating itself from the BSPP, the military leaders of the SLORC believed 
the country would respond more favorably to a new regime which attempted to instill 
pride in being Burmese.  The junta renamed the country Myanmar and changed the 
capital name from Rangoon to Yangon (the names Burma and Rangoon are colonial 
transliterations).90 However, the SLORC also claimed that the CPB had infiltrated the 
NLD and thereby refused to cede power and honor the election results.91 Senior General 
Saw Maung declared martial law and all gatherings of three or more persons were 
deemed illegal.  The SLORC prioritized internal security and embarked on reorganizing 
and expanding the army, while welfare, health, and educational facilities were established 
that catered directly to the military.92  The junta delegated power down to the 
Tatmadaw’s regional commanders who were given political authority over their regions.   
After the 1990 elections, the junta prioritized negotiating ceasefires with the 
ethnic minorities, and over the next several years, seventeen of the twenty-one major 
anti-government forces (with as many as fifty thousand troops) concluded cease-fire 
agreements with the SLORC.93  In 1995, after six years of house arrest, Aung San Suu 
Kyi was released.  Analysts believe the SLORC released her to improve relations with 
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the Japanese in order to resume full-scale development aid, something that had been 
promised if the regime restored political and economic openness in Burma.94 
12. SPDC Assumes Power 
As the SLORC tried to improve the Burmese economy, double-digit inflation 
eroded the value of the population’s wealth and, in 1997, the Asian economic crisis 
brought a halt to much of the foreign investment in Burma.  To create a new and milder 
image, the ruling junta renamed the SLORC the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC) in November 1997.  But despite the new name, it was business as usual.  The 
SPDC focused on destroying the NLD by using party members to intimidate NLD 
members and their families, and incarcerating those who refused to resign.95  The SPDC 
has also relied on Than Shwe’s Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) 
formed in 1993. Officially boasting over 20 million members, the USDA defends the 
interests of the regime by maintaining government control at the local level.96   
Despite coming to ceasefire terms with many of the ethnic minority groups, the 
SLORC/SPDC has persisted in using harsh counterinsurgency tactics such as mass 
relocations of civilians and aggressive intelligence operations. The investment in the 
Tatmadaw has resulted in a trained and effective force which is skilled at marginalizing 
the insurgents.  The SPDC remains at odds with the United States and the European 
Union, but in the past decade has successfully courted its neighbors—China, India, and 
Thailand—to draw investment to Burma to exploit its untapped natural resources. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The SLORC /SPDC have been effective in the last twenty years in maintaining 
power despite mass demonstrations, one of the poorest economies in the world, ongoing 
insurgencies, and pressure from the international community to reform.  The SPDC 
continues to use human trafficking and human rights abuses to control and exploit the 
 
94 Fink, Living Silence, 86. 
95 Fink, Living Silence, 94. 
96 Morton Pedersen, Promoting Human Rights in Burma: A Critique of Western Sanctions Policy 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2008).156-157. 
 33
population and the junta benefits economically from drug trafficking.  As evidenced by 
Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the regime is not willing to open up to the West and the violent 
reaction to the Saffron Revolution in 2007 shows the junta has not changed its approach 
to its opposition and is willing to take on any group, to include Buddhist monks, to retain 
power.  The following chapters will further explore the issues of the regime’s 
counterinsurgency methodology and its use of sovereignty as we examine what options 
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III. COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Today our armed forces are engaged not only in the task of defending the 
state, but as part of their historical duty, are performing other duties in the 
political, economic, and social sectors. Since we have been given, through 
circumstance, the opportunity of shouldering the responsibilities of State 
at this time, we have pledged with pure good will to make every endeavor 
to build a modern developed nation where peace prevails.97  
      Senior General Than Shwe 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Insurgency in ‘independent’ Burma has been ongoing since British colonialism 
ended in 1948.  Even prior to independence, Burmese factions were rebelling against or 
resisting the British and the Japanese.  Since the 1962 coup, the governments of Burma 
have waged ‘successful,’ although lengthy and incomplete, counterinsurgency 
campaigns.  The current government under Than Shwe remains firmly in power with no 
imminent internal or external threat to its rule. However, the government exists in a state 
of enforced stability. In other words, without the SLORC/SPDC’s and the Tatmadaw’s 
violent repression, the country could potentially lapse into factional fighting between 
ethnic groups or fall into civil war.   
Since independence, Burmese governments have negated insurgent threats from 
multiple internal ethnic minority insurgent groups, a faction of the Kuomintang (KMT) 
following defeat by Mao’s Red Army, and the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) backed 
by the People’s Republic of China.  The current regime has also successfully crushed 
national democracy movements, most notably that by the National League for 
Democracy (NLD) originating with student and worker protests. More recently, the junta 
stamped out the uprising led by Buddhist monks known as the ‘Saffron Revolution.”  
What is particularly notable is that Burma’s regimes have quelled these rebellions in a 
part of the world where communist revolts have led to government overthrows in Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam.  
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B. INTERNAL SECURITY – THE REGIME’S PRIORITY  
A long and continuous history of rebellion in Burma has made the ruling junta 
prioritize security above all else.  In quoting from an official Burmese government 
publication Morten Pedersen reports: 
 
The Burmese government’s stance is “security is the most basic and most 
important requirement of the country … A nation without security is 
incapable of doing anything, Economic activities are impossible. Social 
welfare is jeopardized. Governments as well as the people must first 
ensure security to enable them to pursue their objectives.” 98 
 
The stated core values of the Burmese government are reflected in the three main 
national causes of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national solidarity.99  
National sovereignty has been an idea embraced by military rulers ever since Ne Win 
took control in 1962.  Burma’s generals recall the ‘golden age’ of Burman dominance of 
the Bagan, Taungoo, and Konbaung dynasties and live by the notion that the country will 
not fall under the influence of a foreign power again.  Sovereignty is interpreted to not 
only mean keeping foreign influence out of the country, but to maintaining dominant 
internal control.  Territorial integrity, as related to control of the ethnic border areas, has 
been elusive for the Burmese government to achieve in light of insurgencies ongoing for 
almost half a century.  The ruling junta’s counterinsurgency efforts have emphasized 
wresting control of the border areas away from the ethnic rebels.  Finally, national 
solidarity has been a strategic objective of the Burman dominated central government 
since the SLORC took control in 1988.  The idea of a federalist Burma has been rejected 
by the military governments since the end of democratic rule in Burma. With these as its 
guiding strategies, the ruling regimes have adopted counterinsurgency approaches that 
have been effective, brutal, manipulative, and enduring.   
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C. COUNTERINSURGENCY – DEMOCRACY VERSUS AUTHORITARIAN 
RULE  
The U.S. military, since the September 11, 2001, attacks and subsequent 
Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, has devoted a great deal of energy to the study of 
counterinsurgency from a democracy’s perspective. While in theory the 
counterinsurgency objectives of a democracy and an authoritarian regime can be said to 
be similar - namely, to win the support of the population—their approaches differ.  The 
democracy faces greater constraints in its application of counterinsurgency methods than 
the authoritarian regime thanks to its adherence to domestic and international laws and 
sensitivity to public opinion.  The duration of the counterinsurgency, resources devoted, 
and manpower applied are tightly scrutinized by voters, creating pressure for a rapid and 
decisive resolution to conflict.  Ironically, here is where an authoritarian regime exhibits 
much more freedom—exemplified by Burma’s counterinsurgency campaigns that have 
spanned more than half a century.  
It is widely accepted in counterinsurgency theory that the aim is to win the 
support of the population.  The population provides the resources, support and, security 
for the insurgents.  As is often said, win over the population, or achieve its corollary - 
deny access to the population for the insurgents and you can defeat the insurgents.  The 
recent Western approach has been to gain the support of the population for the 
government, based on beefing up the government’s legitimacy.   While defeating the 
insurgency militarily is treated as a top priority, gaining the support of the population is 
deemed a higher priority, with implications for helping guarantee long-term stability of 
the country.  David Galula captures this argument in his book Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: 
If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the 
counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will 
win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power 
depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, 
on its submissiveness.  Thus the battle for the population is a major 
characteristic of the revolutionary war.100  
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D. INSURGENCY IN BURMA 
Burma’s experiences with insurgencies have been shaped by its geography, 
ethnicity, and history.  There is little doubt that the longevity of Burma’s ongoing 
insurgencies is due in large part to their locations in areas inaccessible to the Tatmadaw.  
Burma’s mountainous peripheral areas and porous borders have provided physical 
sanctuary for decades for the ethnic minority insurgents, and help to explain why the 
Burmese government has not decisively defeated the rebellions.  Physical isolation is also 
a partial reason why the various ethnic groups have never successfully united to 
collectively fight the Burman-dominated Tatmadaw and government.  Ethnic autonomy 
is the driving force behind the struggle for each separate group.  A century ago, under 
colonialism, the British furthered the distinction between ethnic groups through their 
“divide and rule’ policy.  The policy kept the Burman majority out of the military while 
the British Burmese military was populated with foreign troops (mainly Indian) and 
ethnic minorities (predominantly Karen, with large factions of Karenni and Kachin).  
British favoritism caused deep-seated resentment among the Burmans which surfaced 
during the Japanese occupation in WWII.  While the Burmans and BIA under Aung San 
eventually turned against the Japanese in 1945, the brutal fighting and atrocities 
committed by the Burmans/Shan against the Karen, Kachin, and Karenni caused greater 
hatred between the ethnic groups.   
By the end of WWII, the seeds of insurgency had been sown and, at 
independence, the seeds of rebellion began to germinate.  On WWII’s conclusion, with 
the end of British colonialism imminent, hope for a united Burma faded with the 
assassination of Aung San.  Promises for autonomy made at the Panglong Conference 
resurfaced when Ne Win took power in the face of breakaway movements by the ethnic 
minorities.  The Karen, who looked to the British to grant them autonomy, quickly 
rebelled when they realized the new independent government had no intention of granting 
them autonomy. Ne Win, one of the ‘Thirty Comrades,’ who was trained by the Japanese 
in WWII, adopted many of the Kempeitai’s counterinsurgency practices which were later 
further refined by the SLORC/SPDC.   
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 At independence, the Burman National Army (BNA) was a weak force and a 
large cause of concern for the U Nu government in light of the numerous threats the 
government faced.  Ne Win, then head of the military, saw the inherent danger of having 
a weak military, and immediately set out to strengthen the BNA.  The armed forces grew 
from 2,000 at independence to 100,000 when Ne Win secured power in 1962.101 The 
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the KMT created huge challenges for the Ne Win 
government and the Tatmadaw.  The CPB, backed by the PRC, was able to generate 
some support among the ethnic groups, but even with good leadership and ample 
amounts of arms, the CPB was not able to topple the government and the Tatmadaw kept 
the communists off balance until the CPB collapsed in 1989.  Probably the biggest reason 
the CPB was not able to establish a base in the Irrawaddy Plains is because communism 
did not gain popular support among the ethnic Burmans.   
The KMT in the 1950s was also well armed and became influential in the drug 
trade operating out of the Shan State.  The KMT initially threatened the U Nu 
government, but was ultimately defeated by the Tatmadaw.  The KMT originally enjoyed 
U.S. support because of its anti-communist stance, but in a brokered agreement was 
eventually forced to retreat to Taiwan to rejoin Chiang Kai-shek and the main KMT 
force.   
The Karen insurgency initially was successful in pushing to Insein on the outskirts 
of Rangoon.  However, the Karen eventually lost their foothold and were pushed back 
into the Karen State.  Following his 1962 coup, Ne Win held a “Peace Parley” in 1963-64 
with representatives of the larger minority groups and a representative from the CPB.102 
Martin Smith describes the parley: 
During these rare face-to-face meetings, none of the ethnic insurgent 
parties demanded actual secession, although they continued to claim the 
conceptual right.  The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), for 
example, called for an independent Kachin state with the rights of 
secession and self-determinations; the Communist Party of Arakan (CPA) 
wanted a ‘Republic of Arakan’ with the right of secession; and the Shan 
groups called for a federal system of states. But ethnic delegates later 
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complained that, during the talks, Tatmadaw officers only ever really 
called on their groups to surrender. Ne Win, especially, was concerned 
that formal ceasefires could lead to partition of Burma, as had happened in 
Korea and Vietnam.103   
 
Following the Peace Parley, the Tatmadaw embarked on almost continuous 
counterinsurgency operations for the next 25 years.  Modeled on the British ‘new village’ 
tactics in Malaysia and the U.S. ‘strategic hamlet’ operations in Vietnam, Ne Win 
implemented a policy called “Four Cuts” which was intended to cut all links to food, 
funds, intelligence, and recruits between local villagers and insurgent forces.104  Some 
believe Four Cuts to be a derivation of the Japanese army’s sanko seisaku or ‘three all’ 
policy in China (‘kill all; burn all; destroy all’).105  Because they were authoritarian 
military governments, neither the Ne Win regime and nor the subsequent SLORC/SPDC 
juntas were compelled to adopt a “hearts and mind’ approach to sway the population.   
E. COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
One advantage an authoritarian regime has over a democracy in 
counterinsurgency operations is more leeway in how it can influence the population.  For 
instance, destruction or forced relocation of a population sympathetic to the insurgents 
effectively eliminates insurgent movements.  This is a technique employed at least since 
Roman times.  Another example of a policy used often in the past, exemplified by the 
British in the Boer War, is a scorched earth policy resulting in removal of insurgent 
sustenance through the destruction of property, killing of livestock, and burning of 
crops.106  Although such extreme measures might seem to be unacceptable in the modern 
world, recent examples of brutal counterinsurgency practices have occurred throughout 
the world in the last half-century without actions being taken against the offending 
government.  Sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States against  
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Burma for government repression of its people have been systematically rejected by the 
ruling junta which accuses the EU and U.S. of having themselves employed these same 
harsh practices in the past.   
The Spanish, French, Dutch, and British, for instance, resorted to extreme 
violence in quelling uprisings within their colonies, while the U.S. government forced 
relocation of Indian tribes from their ancestral lands to reservations. The Chinese crushed 
rebellions in Tibet in 1956 and 1959 with great violence, orchestrating mass killings, the 
deportation of tens of thousands, and the admission of children to re-education centers.107  
Harsh repression of the Tibetans by the Chinese continues today.  The Indonesians took 
control of East Timor in 1976 and, in the process of consolidating power, killed 30 
percent of the East Timorese population with napalm bombing and starvation.108 The 
remainder were herded into huge camps with no access to food and then resettled in new 
villages easily controlled by the Indonesian military.109 Saddam Hussein used forced 
relocations, conventional military attacks, and even chemical weapons to subdue the 
Kurds.   
F. BURMESE COUNTERINSURGENCY THROUGH COERCION 
Key to the Burmese governments’ ability to maintain power for fifty years has 
been their capacity to escalate the level of violence and brutality in response to resistance, 
combined with their capacity to co-opt insurgents.  Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf 
describe insurgent movements as systems, with inputs to the system obtained mostly 
from the internal environment (what they call endogeny) and from external actors (which 
they call exogeny).110 According to Leites and Wolf, the insurgents rely on a “mix” 
between endogeny and exogeny, and for inputs from the local environment, they rely on 
both persuasion and coercion.111 Stealing a page from the insurgent playbook, the 
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Burmese military rulers have denied inputs from the local environment by removing 
those providing the inputs from the areas where insurgents find support. Typically, 
authoritarian leaders, in this case the Burmese military rulers, use both coercion and 
persuasion to cut off inputs to the insurgents.  Democracies, in contrast, find themselves 
much more restricted in their use of coercion.   
One of the most effective coercive strategies employed by the Burmese military 
regimes has been forced relocation of ethnic minorities suspected of supporting 
insurgents in border areas.  Used widely in Burma by the Japanese in WWII against the 
Karen, Kachin, and Karenni, Ne Win saw the effectiveness of this strategy and applied it 
against resistant ethnic minorities throughout the country. Following the 1963 peace 
parley, ethnic and communist insurgents engaged the Tatmadaw in the remote and 
mountainous border areas, particularly in the northeast part of the country along the 
Chinese border (e.g., Kachin and Shan States).  Simultaneous insurgent military 
offensives spread the Tatmadaw thin and Ne Win found himself forced to cede large 
portions of the border areas to insurgent control.  While Ne Win established a security 
cordon around the cities in the Irrawaddy plain, he then unleashed the ‘Four Cuts’ policy 
against the insurgents. 112 Burma was divided into maps resembling a chessboard, with 
military districts shaded one of three colors: black for entirely insurgent-controlled areas; 
brown for areas both sides still disputed; and white for ‘insurgent free’ zones/districts.113   
Once areas had been color-coded, Tatmadaw units moved in and ordered the 
villagers in brown districts to move to new villages near army bases.  The villagers were 
told that anyone who did not comply would be considered an insurgent and shot.  The 
Tatmadaw then returned to their villages to confiscate food, destroy crops, burn houses, 
and shoot any remaining villagers. Often villagers were forced into service as porters for 
the army, and children were conscripted.  The Tatmadaw’s tactics proved devastatingly 
successful, and only when the operations ran up against the borders of Burma’s neighbors 
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(Bangladesh, India, China, and Thailand) did ‘Four Cuts’ prove insufficient as insurgents 
used cross-border sanctuaries for resupply and protection.114   
The Karen, who had occupied areas close to Rangoon during the U Nu era, were 
the first targets of this approach.  The Karen were pushed out of their villages toward the 
Thai border where many refugees settled just inside Thailand.  The Kachin and Shan 
were also forcibly moved by the tens of thousands.115   
The SLORC/SPDC adopted ‘Four Cuts’ and used it as ruthlessly as had Ne Win.  
The SLORC/SPDC, however, added several new variants.  In Rakhine State, for instance, 
the SLORC created ‘model villages’ made to intentionally target Muslim Rohingya.  
Rakhine Buddhists and other non-Rohingya were relocated to majority Rohingya villages 
where they were given land confiscated from the Muslims.116  Rohingya who had thus 
been separated from their land were then forced to work for their new Buddhist landlords.  
The intention of this ‘model village’ program was to undermine the Rohingya power base 
and use the Rakhine Buddhists to monitor the Muslims, which doubled as a further 
control measure.117  
G. SLORC/SPDC’S NEW STRATEGY 
While the SLORC/SPDC have used coercion to maintain control along Burma’s 
borders, in the aftermath of the democracy movement of 1988 as the SLORC/SPDC had 
to adopt a new counterinsurgency methodology in the form of persuasion.  Faced with 
threats from ethnic minority insurgents and the Burman democracy movement, the ruling 
junta feared the possibility that the insurgents and pro-democracy organizers would unite 
against it. Consequently, the junta greatly expanded the military from 1988 to 1996, with 
the Tatmadaw growing from 186,000 to 370,000 soldiers.118  The military rulers also 
spent $1 billion on 140 new combat aircraft, 30 naval vessels, 170 tanks, 250 armored 
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personnel carriers, as well as rocket launch systems, anti-aircraft artillery, infantry 
weapons, and telecommunications surveillance equipment.119  
While strengthening its posture militarily, the government strove to compel local 
communities to press insurgent groups to seek ceasefires by offering local leaders 
political and economic incentives.120  According to Martin Smith: 
As the 1990s drew on, the very existence of such co-operative schemes 
involving former battlefield foes decisively changed the military and 
political balance in much of the country…Scant resources could be 
conserved and troops redeployed to more troubled regions of the country.  
Moreover, by vigorously entering the economic field, the Tatmadaw was 
to have far more success in seizing the local initiative from armed 
opposition groups than it ever had in 26 years of fighting. 121 
  
Seventeen ethnic groups accepted ceasefires, beginning with CPB breakup in 
1989, when the government offered agreements to CPB subgroups to dissuade them from 
joining the National Democratic Front (NDF).   
As part of the ceasefire agreements, the government imposed a no-contact policy 
between groups. This was in keeping with the junta’s ‘divide and conquer’ strategy.122  
The agreements also granted the government and the military access into the ethnic 
minority areas, which the junta quickly took advantage of by constructing roads into the 
heart of the insurgent border areas.  These new roads, in turn, gave the government 
greater access to more remote areas and gave the Tatmadaw more control over the ethnic 
minority populations at a relatively cheap price.  Overall, these ceasefires helped remove 
the government’s primary threats: an effective alliance among the insurgent ethnic 
armies; and second, the more threatening possibility, a union between the ethnic minority 
armies and the majority Burman opposition.123  
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H. RESOURCE CONTROL 
In the border areas, ethnic insurgents were able to control illicit economic activity 
in ‘lootable’ resources traded on Burma’s black market.124 This became especially 
significant after the economy spiraled downward during Ne Win’s socialist ‘experiment.’ 
Control of these resources was critical to funding the insurgencies. Black market taxes 
were applied to: gems, minerals, and timber in the Kachin and Karenni States; teak and 
cattle in the Karen State; and narcotics in the Shan State.125  Michael L. Ross 
hypothesizes that the more ‘lootable’ a resource is, the more it benefits a rebel group, 
while the more ’unlootable’ a resource is the more it benefits the government.  Such was 
the case in Burma until the ceasefires, when trade in ‘lootable’ resources across 
previously uncontrolled borders, was essentially ‘legalized’ by the Burmese government. 
With Tatmadaw access to the borders, the junta was able to reap the benefit of taxes on 
‘lootable’ resources as they transited the country.  The SLORC/SPDC sometimes used 
‘tax’ concessions of this sort to co-opt insurgent leaders and ensure that they honored the 
ceasefires.   
In the 1990s, when these ceasefires were brokered, Burma was the world’s 
leading opium cultivator. The majority of the narcotics trade originated from the Shan 
State and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) emerged from the ceasefires as the leading 
narcotics producer in Burma.  By gaining access to the border areas of the Shan State the 
Burmese government was able to derive profits from opium.  However, in 1999, the 
SPDC announced a 15-year plan to rid Burma of drugs by 2014; the announcement was 
in line with ASEAN’s program to rid Southeast Asia of drugs by 2015.126 Burma’s 
announcement was viewed with skepticism internationally, but the opium trade has been 
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reduced significantly since the 1990s.  Burma dropped to second in the world in opium 
production next to Afghanistan (the source of 93% of the world’s opium today).127  
At the same time, however, production of methamphetamines in Burma has 
skyrocketed, originating again from the UWSA in the Shan State.  The area in Southeast 
Asia, along the Burmese, Thai, and Laotian borders known as the ‘Golden Triangle,’ has 
shifted to methamphetamine production and is now known as the ‘Ice Triangle.’  While 
the SPDC has taken some measures to reduce methamphetamines and has even 
cooperated with the U.S. and its neighbors to reduce trafficking, it is widely believed that 
the government is indirectly profiting.128 Army officers who operate on the border are 
believed to directly profit from the trade and Burma, which ranked 178 of 180 countries 
in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perception Index, is believed to be 
laundering drug money and funneling the profits into businesses which benefit the 
junta.129  Burma, is not only under pressure from the U.S., EU, and the United Nations to 
eliminate its drug activity, but Burma’s immediate neighbors China, India, and Thailand, 
are applying what is likely to be even more persuasive pressure.  These border countries 
have been experiencing the disruptive effects of narcotics violence, corruption, and abuse 
in their own populations, as well as a vast surge in HIV infection rates.  Even so, in terms 
of its own counterinsurgency strategy, Burma’s policies toward drugs can be considered a 
success since it has largely neutralized the drug trade as a source of funds for insurgents 
who, ironically, used their drug profits to buy weapons smuggled across these same 
borders.  
I. INTELLIGENCE IN BURMA  
Burma’s counterinsurgency campaigns since independence have relied heavily 
Burma’s intelligence services, which have had the challenge of attaining an information 
advantage over the multiple insurgencies. Perhaps more importantly in authoritarian 
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Burma, the intelligence services have served as a check on dissidents who belong to the 
Burman ethnic majority, as well as on the military itself.  The intelligence services in 
Burma have expanded greatly in members and numbers since their formation in 1948.  
Then the Military Intelligence Services (MIS) consisted of only three sections for the 
entire country.130  Ne Win, as head of the Tatmadaw, rapidly expanded the size of the 
MIS in response to the Karen, KMT, and CPB insurgencies thatposed a serious threat to 
the fledgling government.  Civilian intelligence agencies were also created in the 1950s, 
consisting of the police Criminal Investigative Department (CID) that targeted internal 
conspiracies, the Special Investigations Department (SID) to handle both intelligence and 
counterintelligence functions focused on internal political movements, and the Bureau of 
Special Investigation (BSI) chartered to uncover economic crimes and corruption in 
government.131  
The MIS initially focused its collection efforts on combat intelligence to support 
the Tatmadaw’s counterinsurgency efforts and used very little coercion to gain 
intelligence from the insurgents.  When Ne Win took control of the country, however, he 
quickly adopted Kempeitai methods.132 Ne Win appointed a former military colleague 
Tin Oo, to consolidate the intelligence services and create a new “security” establishment 
for domestic intelligence and counterintelligence to ensure his political survival133  Tin 
Oo focused collection efforts on HUMINT, relying on paid informants to gather anti-
government information and turn in suspected conspirators.  
It was at this point that the Burmese government began to repress all segments of 
Burmese society using the Tatmadaw and intelligence services.  The MIS earned its 
fearsome reputation among the Burmese for its use of mass arrests, executions, and 
torture.  The MIS still conducted successful anti-insurgent intelligence operations by 
breaking CPB codes and infiltrating ethnic minority networks, but its primary focus 
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shifted to domestic intelligence operations.  The MIS operated outside of the purview of 
the Tatmadaw and reported directly to Ne Win.  MIS agents conducted periodic internal 
purges of high-ranking officers suspected of plotting against the regime.   
J. JUNTA INTELLIGENCE 
Fearing a power grab by the Directorate of Defense Intelligence Services (DDIS, 
formerly the MIS, renamed in 1969), Ne Win removed Tin Oo as head of the intelligence 
services, purged the DDIS, and appointed a loyal military officer, Khin Nyunt, in his 
place in 1983.134 Khin Nyunt reformed the DDIS and, when the democracy protests 
began after Ne Win stepped down in 1988, worked with the Tatmadaw to crush the 
movement.   The newly formed SLORC then gave the intelligence services the mission of 
ferreting out dissidents, which it performed efficiently and ruthlessly.  As the ceasefire 
initiative gathered momentum, once again, the intelligence services were expanded to 
ensure ethnic minorities and the Burman-led democracy movement did not coalesce.   
Khin Nyunt formed the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) in a bid for greater 
political security.135  The OSS consisted of five departments: international affairs; 
narcotics; security; ethnic affairs; and science and the environment.136 OSS officers were 
hand-picked, well educated, and all spoke fluent English.  The intelligence services 
continued to carry out the traditional functions of interrogations and tortures, but now the 
OSS gave the SLORC an intellectual capability previously lacking in the central 
government.137   It was thus logical for the SLORC leadership to call on Khin Nyunt in 
the 1990s to broker the ceasefire agreements with insurgent groups.  In doing so, the 
intelligence services gained access to black market economies in the insurgent states, 
which further bolstered their wealth and power.   
Khin Nyunt successfully used traditional HUMINT collection techniques 
Kempeitai-like “neighborhood watch” programs, and source collection to gather 
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information on the opposition.  But he also introduced technology to include electronic 
monitoring, buying equipment from Russia, North Korea, and Singapore.138  Despite or 
perhaps because of Khin Nyunt’s success running Burma’s intelligence operations, the 
Tatmadaw, whose leaders ultimately rule the country, began to sense a threat.  In 2004, 
Senior General Than Shwe arrested Khin Nyunt and so began another purge of the 
intelligence services. Following the purge, the intelligence services were reformed under 
military command and regional commanders now oversee intelligence activities in their 
areas of operations.  The SPDC, through its intelligence services, continues to prioritize 
internal threats, targeting the pro-democracy movement and concentrating on students 
and the education system and, most recently, the country’s Buddhist monks.  
K. OTHER METHODS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
The authoritarian rulers in Burma have also manipulated insurgent funding in 
other ways as part of the ‘Four Cuts’ strategy.  The Ne Win regime, for instance, 
demonetarized the Burmese currency three times while in power.  The third 
demonetarization of the kyat in 1987 was intended to bankrupt the insurgent economy by 
undercutting the black market, but led instead to a serious outbreak of riots and 
demonstrations (a precursor to the uprisings that followed in 1988).139  
Since 1988, the ruling junta has readdressed its counterinsurgency campaign 
policies, and directed much of its efforts to quell the pro-democracy movement.  Since 
demonstrations and uprisings often originate from students at Burma’s universities, the 
regime has made efforts to neutralize the universities.  Following the 1988 uprising, 
many of Burma’s largest universities were shut down for multiple years.  Distance 
learning has been offered as an alternative to university attendance, since this allows 
students to study but minimizes their congregating on campuses.140 Campuses have also 
been split and constructed away from the centers of larger cities.  Regional campuses 
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have been established to purposely disperse students across the country.141  It is much 
more difficult to “take to the streets” from a small rural campus than a university located 
in Rangoon or Mandalay, and in Burma today it takes only a hint of an uprising to give 
the regime the excuse it needs to close a university.   
The ruling junta has likewise gone to great lengths to control information flows 
via telecommunications, the media, and the Internet.  News media have no domestic 
freedom and journalists in Burma have faced severe scrutiny and intimidation. In 2008, 
ten journalists were imprisoned for writing articles deemed negative toward the 
government, with some receiving prison sentences of up to 19 years.142  Members of 
Burma’s censorship bureau pour over publications searching for anti-regime messages 
within the text.143 Aung San Suu Kyi’s name cannot be mentioned in print unless the text 
slanders either her or the NLD.  According to leading media watchdog group, Committee 
to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Burma is the worst Internet freedom violator, and the CPJ 
named Burma one of the ten worst countries in which to be a blogger.144  One Burmese 
blogger is serving a 35-year prison term for distributing video footage of Cyclone Nargis.   
The government blocks a great deal of Internet information entering the country, 
and during Nargis and the Saffron Revolution the junta completely shut down digital 
information coming into the country.  Private Internet use is rare in Burma, and most 
Burmese rely on Internet cafes to go online.  The cafes are closely monitored by 
government agents to detect negative information transmitted out of the country.   
Telecommunications are also tightly controlled and monitored by the junta through the 
Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), which runs the country’s phone service.  
The government has curtailed mobile phone usage by making the phones prohibitively 
expensive for average Burmese. In a world which continues to grow more connected 
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through the use of cell phones, satellite television, and cheap and fast Internet service, the 
ruling junta expends a great deal of effort to minimize their usage.   
Cutting off its citizens from the world parallels the junta’s recent move to isolate 
the country’s leaders from the rest of the country.  Establishing Naypyidaw (which means 
“abode of the kings”) in 2007, the junta built the new capital on the advice of astrologers 
and out of fear of attack (from the West) given Rangoon’s accessibility from the sea.145 
In a country stricken by almost daily power outages, the Naypyidaw is ablaze with lights 
from a power plant constructed to provide electricity to the chosen few who occupy 
positions of prominence in the government.146   
L. MILITARY LOYALTY 
What is perhaps most remarkable about authoritarian rule in Burma over the past 
almost fifty years has been the unwavering loyalty of the military. Typical of many 
authoritarian regimes, the rulers have long used the intelligence services to monitor the 
activities of regional commanders.  While purges of subordinate officers have occurred 
since the advent of military rule in Burma, for the most part the military has never posed 
a threat to power.  While Burma’s military rulers have neglected the development of a 
capable civil service, the trend for the government has been to lavish resources on its own 
support base, the Tatmadaw.147 Military officers in the Tatmadaw receive numerous 
privileges including subsidized food, housing, health care, and education.  Many families 
in Burma depend on relatives in the military to provide basic necessities.  Military 
officers often seek further financial perks from involvement in the black market, border 
taxes, and the drug trade.  The military also freely uses forced labor wherever it operates 
and the Tatmadaw has been insulated from declining revenue collection in recent years 
because the junta rarely cuts spending on the military.   
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M. EXTERNAL THREATS 
Aside from ‘buying’ loyalty by making the military a lucrative career choice for 
individual Burmese, regimes since Ne Win’s day have effectively used threats from 
without to keep the military unified.  Up until the demise of the CPB in 1989, the threat 
of a communist takeover served as rallying point for the Tatmadaw, and the SLORC 
pointed to an underlying communist conspiracy as the cause for the 1988 uprising.  The 
threat of ethnic minority insurgencies similarly provided a common cause for the 
military.  In recent years, possible Western intervention in Burma has provided a 
common focus for the Tatmadaw.  
N. DIPLOMACY  
As described earlier in the chapter, Burma’s authoritarian regimes have 
effectively neutralized ethnic insurgents’ bases of internal support by forcibly relocating 
or destroying villages.  The ceasefires of the 1990s granted the Tatmadaw greater access 
to the border areas and control of key border crossings.  Because the ethnic minority 
insurgents in Burma had been able to rely on cross-border sanctuaries in India and 
Bangladesh (Arakan, Chin), China (Kachin, Shan), and Thailand (Shan, Karen, Karenni) 
in the past, the SLORC/SPDC has actively pursued engagement with its neighbors since 
taking power in 1988.  By improving relations with its neighbors, especially long-time 
rival Thailand, the SLORC/SPDC has diminished the ability of ethnic minorities or pro-
democracy dissidents to find sanctuary.  Here is one description of how the Thai 
government reversed its policy towards Karen insurgents: 
 
Until the late 1980s, the Thai government tacitly allowed groups like the 
KNU to retreat into Thailand when they were under attack from 
[Burmese] government forces…yet, since the SLORC assumed 
power…Thai leaders have found it more advantageous to seek an 
improvement in their relations with the [Burmese] government. The 
insurgent groups have thus come under significant Thai pressure to reach 
peace with Rangoon…in the mid-1990’s, the Thai authorities not only 
moved to stop the Burmese insurgents from retreating into safety across 
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the border, but on several occasions allowed the army to cross into 
Thailand and attack them from behind.148  
 
At the same time, in the 1990s India sought to improve ties with the junta in the 
hopes of limiting China’s influence, and in 1995 the Indian and Burmese militaries 
conducted ‘Operation Golden Bird’ to capture insurgents along both sides of their shared 
border.  149 Counterinsurgency doctrine promotes denial of sanctuaries and, as stated in 
Army Field Manual 3-24, “Effective COIN operations work to eliminate all sanctuaries.” 
150 Galula points out that “the length of international borders, particularly if the 
neighboring countries are sympathetic to the insurgents, as was the case in Greece, 
Indochina, and Algeria, favors the insurgent.”151 The SLORC has effectively overcome 
the need for closing its borders, which stretch over 3,600 miles by gaining the 
cooperation of its neighbors to withdraw or deny sanctuary to the junta’s internal 
enemies.  
O. CONCLUSION 
The military in Burma has retained power for nearly half a century in spite of 
almost continual insurgency, internal resistance in the form of protest movements, and 
international pressure and sanctions.  The current regime under Than Shwe consists of a 
group of military generals who lack worldly knowledge.152 Yet, this ruling junta, like Ne 
Win’s previous administration, has run an effective counterinsurgency campaign. Nor 
does the current regime appear to be in jeopardy of relinquishing power in the near 
future.   
The Western powers have been ineffective in influencing Burma to relent from 
policies which promote, or at the very least permit, human suffering.  At the same time, 
Burma has been able to become less isolationist by establishing trade and diplomatic 
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relations with its immediate neighbors and other non-Western countries in response to 
Western pressures to reform. Globalization has presented the junta numerous 
opportunities to expand trade to further line its pockets. The next chapter will examine 
external influences on Burma and implications for its future foreign policy.  
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IV. RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
REGIONAL/INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE (POST-1988) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Having nationalized Burma’s primary industries and intentionally isolated the 
country from foreign investors, Ne Win’s socialist experiment left Burma’s economy in 
ruins.  Only small reserves of foreign currency remained when he stepped down in 1988.  
Upon taking over the SLORC instituted a new private-enterprise-led market economy 
and offered incentives to foreign investors in order to gain desperately needed foreign 
currency.153 The SLORC’s new economic policy created an opening for foreign 
businesses. It is not surprising that since 1988 the countries with the most influence in 
Burma have been those with the most invested in the country.  This chapter will first 
examine Burma’s economic development since 1988 before turning to external 
influences. To be noted is that the SLORC/SPDC, has attempted to minimize outside 
interference in Burma’s internal politics, even while opening the country to foreign 
investment and trade.   
B. THE SLORC’S TRANSITION FROM NE WIN’S SOCIALISM 
At the time of Ne Win’s departure in 1988, Burma’s currency, the Kyat, was 
artificially overvalued and the official exchange rate was 6 Kyat to the US$1, while the 
unofficial or black market rate was running between 300 and 400 Kyat to US$1.154 The 
SLORC needed foreign investors and foreign currency to develop its various enterprises, 
especially to extract its reserves of natural gas and oil.  Consequently, it passed the 
Foreign Investment Law (FIL) to attract foreign investors by offering a number of 
financial incentives to prospective businesses.155  
In addition to its untapped natural resources, Burma offered a large labor pool at 
extremely low wages.  However, despite high rates of literacy, Burmese lacked technical 
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skills.  Investment in some industries required firms to provide their own skilled labor, 
thus raising costs.  The other prohibitive drawback to investment in Burma was the 
requirement for foreign investors to exchange their currency at the official exchange rate 
when entering and exiting the country.   The SLORC controlled the banking system and 
set interest rates. With banks offering negative interest rates to depositors, private 
investors were (and still are) forced to resort to the black market for collateral loans at 3 
to 4 percent per month and non-collateral loans at 5 to 8 percent per month.156 With 
foreign investors deterred by currency exchange obstacles and little investment capital to 
draw from Burmese banks, the SLORC looked to the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide loans to facilitate its economic development.  The 
World Bank and IMF, under pressure from the U.S., were unwilling to provide loans to 
Burma due to the SLORC’s violent repression of the pro-democracy movement.157  
A further investment disincentive since the late 1980s has been the lack of 
developed infrastructure in Burma.  Roads outside of the large cities are often in poor 
condition and impassible for heavy vehicles, especially during the monsoons/rainy 
season.  Railroads, ports, and storage facilities are inadequate to support rapid 
development.  
However, despite all of the problems facing foreign investors in Burma in the 
1990s, international businesses still streamed in to exploit Burma’s reserves of oil and 
natural gas, deposits of minerals, vast teak forests, and rich fisheries. The SLORC also 
saw tourism as a way to draw foreign currency and attempted to build up the 
transportation infrastructure and hotel industry.  But the resource that has been, and is to 
this day, most lucrative to the Burmese junta is natural gas.   
C.  RESOURCES AND TRADE 
1. Natural Gas 
Cumulatively, Burma’s natural gas fields hold over 500 billion cubic  meters of 
natural gas which is enough to bring in $2 billion annually to the junta for the next 40 
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years.158  The Burmese government began earning revenue from natural gas with the 
completion of the Yadana field project in 1998.  Yadana, which carries gas from the Gulf 
of Martaban to Thailand via a 256 mile pipeline, was a joint venture of Burma’s state-
owned energy company, the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), in partnership 
with Total Oil (France), Unocal (United States), and PTT Exploration and Production 
(PTTE – Thailand).159  
Another gas project, the Yetagan fields, came online in 2000 and was developed 
by a consortium made up of MOGE, Nippon Oil (Japan), and Premier Oil (UK).160 
Premier dropped out of the Yetagan Project in response to domestic consumer protests 
and was replaced by the Malaysian company, Petronas.  The Yadana and Yetagan 
projects have been controversial internationally thanks to accusations made by 
environmental groups of forced labor conscripted by the Tatmadaw to work on the 
project, and the displacement of villages to make room for the pipeline on its way to 
Thailand. Total and Unocal have publicly denied allegations of human rights abuses and 
point to their chief responsibility, which is to maximize profits for their shareholders. As 
Unocal put it: “Unocal is a global energy company, not a political agency. Our 
participation in the Yadana project is based on resource potential, business economics 
and technical expertise.”161  
Another large deposit of natural gas was discovered off the Arakan coast in 
2004.162 This new set of fields, known as the Shwe (Gold) fields was explored by a 
consortium that partnered MOGE with South Korea’s Daewoo Corporation, the Korean 
Gas Corporation, the Gas Authority of India Limited, and India’s Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation.163 India was presumed to be the customer for the Shwe Gas Fields, but 
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difficulties arose when Bangladesh refused to allow the pipeline to cross its borders 
without concessions.  The Burmese junta reconsidered its contracts with India and three 
days after China vetoed a punitive Security Council resolution, the Burmese government 
granted a Chinese company a major gas and oil exploration contract even though an 
Indian company outbid the Chinese company. 164   
In all of this, the SLORC/SPDC, while adopting a capitalist-type approach to 
development, has proved willing to default to whatever it deems best for maintaining 
power. In this case, its security relationship with China outweighed its profit margin on a 
project.  
2. Tourism 
The second most popular boom area for foreign investors is in hotels and tourism.  
165 Uncharacteristically, and again shedding its isolationist stance, the regime opened the 
country to foreign tourists in the 1990s.  In 1990, a Tourism Law recognized tourism as a 
significant economic activity, allowing local and foreign private operators to run hotels, 
transport businesses, and tour guide services.166  The SLORC officially designated 1996 
as “Visit Myanmar Year” in order to entice organized tour operators from Europe and 
Asia and to encourage hotel construction.167  Even though the SLORC privatized tourism 
on the surface, the regime again turned to forced labor to renovate historical sites and 
build hotels and infrastructure.  Villagers were displaced to make room for new 
construction.   
Yet, with fluctuations in electricity, very little public health care, and watchful 
agents throughout the country, Burma, while possessing tremendous natural beauty, is not 
for the casual traveler.  Also, in 1996 Aung San Suu Kyi initiated an anti-tourism 
campaign to boycott the government’s tourism initiatives.  This has helped dissuade  
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many Western tourists from traveling to Burma.  But in spite of these deterrents, the 
tourism industry still manages to bring in substantial amounts of foreign currency for the 
government.    
3. Teak and Hardwood 
Burma’s teak industry has its roots in the British colonial period and, 
interestingly, Burmese teak growers adopted scientific forestry cultivation techniques 
from Central Europe in the nineteenth century.168  Under the British, Burma had what 
many regard as the finest forest service in the world.169 In the mid-twentieth century, 
Burma utilized full management plans for its forests, unlike its neighbors India, Laos, and 
especially Thailand, which devastated its teak and/or hardwood forests.  But again, the 
need for foreign currency led the SLORC in 1988 to increase teak exports and invite 
foreign firms to log teak and hardwood forests while paying logging concessions to the 
government.  By 1992/93, twenty-eight percent of production was by foreign firms, many 
from Thailand (which banned logging in Thailand in 1989 due to erosion caused by 
deforestation).170  
China has participated in agreements to log teak and hardwoods in the Shan and 
Kachin states, which have experienced severe deforestation.  The grim condition of 
Burma’s economy in the late 1980s, combined with the end of kerosene production by 
the government and a growing population, led to overuse of wood for cooking and 
building materials.  Illegal logging has also had dire effects on forest conservation. Some 
estimate that 98% of Burma’s timber exports to China were illegally logged from 2001 to 
2004.171 The short-term gains in logging profits by the government neglect the potential 
long term damage to Burma’s forest from overcutting, especially of teak which requires 
three to five decades to replace.172   
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4. Gems 
Gems (rubies, sapphires, jade, and other gems) have been traded in Burma since 
the time of the kingdoms.  In the 1960s, the Burmese government nationalized the 
gemstone industry, appointed military personnel to jobs in the precious stone trade and, 
by doing so, drove a large portion of the gemstone trade underground.173   
The SLORC/SPDC has relied on the gem trade to generate foreign currency and 
global gem exports from Burma in fiscal year 2007-2008 reached as high as $647 
million.174 In 2008, the U.S. passed the Tom Lantos Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-
Democratic Efforts) Act, which bans the import of Burmese gems to the United States. 
175 Although several Western countries have banned Burmese gems, the SLORC/SPDC 
is able to export gems through India, China, and Thailand to world markets and sanctions 
have had little effect on the Burmese gem trade.176  
5. Fishing 
With an extensive coastline, good ocean conditions, and a large demand in the 
region for fish, Burma’s fishing industry has great potential. The fishing industry was not 
exploited prior to the SLORC assuming power.  The SLORC sought to quickly cash in on 
its abundant fish resources by granting fishing concessions to neighboring countries.  In 
1988, the Burmese Government sold fishing rights in Burma’s offshore areas to Thai, 
Malaysian, Korean, and Singaporean fishing firms.177 As with Burma’s other extractive 
industries, decades of long term planning and regulation were compromised to allow for 
rapid exploitation to produce cash flows.  Consequently overfishing in Burma has 
become a cause of concern for environmentalists, with depletion of fisheries headed 
down the same path as in neighboring Thailand. 
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D. FOREIGN ENGAGEMENT 
1. China 
Following the 1988 crisis, subsequent crackdown by the SLORC, and 
nullification of the 1990 election, Burma was vilified by the West and India.  Thailand, 
for instance, responded to the 1988 crisis by providing safe haven to Burmese dissidents.  
On the other hand, this is exactly when Burma’s relationship with its longtime adversary 
China began to improve.  When China ended its support for the CPB the SLORC was 
relieved of a major external threat.178  Subsequently, China adopted a good-neighbor 
policy during the 1990s and, as Jurgen Haacke points out, Burma reaped immediate 
benefits: 
First, China deflected Western human-rights criticism targeting Myanmar. 
At the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1990, Beijing 
prevented the adoption of the first-ever draft resolution on the human-
rights situation in Myanmar (but thereafter fell into line, allowing future 
draft resolutions to be adopted by consensus).   Second, an initial border 
trade agreement reached in 1988 paved the way for substantial economic 
exchange with China. Following Than Shwe’s visit to China in October 
1989, Chinese and particularly Yunnanese state companies began to play 
major parts in the economic reconstruction of northern Myanmar, 
especially by building power stations, roads, bridges, and 
telecommunications facilities. In return, Myanmar agreed to exploitation 
by Chinese companies of natural resources in the ethnic-minority areas 
along the border.  Third, two substantial arms deals with China in 1990 
and 1994, worth about US$2.1 billion and US$400  million respectively, 
allowed the Tatmadaw to replenish and upgrade its armaments for 
counterinsurgency operations and conventional war-fighting on land and 
sea.179 
 
China’s extraordinary economic expansion in the late 1990s created a 
corresponding need for energy and natural resources, and the Chinese government has 
prioritized development of Yunnan Province and southwest China, which economically 
lag far behind the coastal areas in development.180 Burma’s untapped energy resources 
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and geographic location make the country key to these two Chinese development goals. 
Chinese influence has spread south to Mandalay, and thousands of Chinese have settled 
in the Kachin State with the SLORC, surprisingly, issuing new Burmese identity cards, 
which grant Chinese the same rights as Burmese nationals.181  
Since 1989, China has assisted Burma in a multitude of development projects, and 
thus Burma has been perceived to be a Chinese client state.  However, after initial 
Chinese cooperation and investment in the 1990s, the SLORC/SPDC has tried to 
diversify its dependence on its expansive neighbor.  Because China sank money into 
infrastructure projects, it has been thought that China looks to Burma as a future forward 
base of operations in Southeast Asia, and that China is seeking permanent bases, 
especially sea bases for its navy.182 But although the SLORC/SPDC may have opened 
Burma to Chinese foreign investment, the regime has attempted to minimize bilateral 
political or military dependence on China.  For instance, the regime has bought weapons 
from Russia, Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea, Ukraine, and Singapore.183   
From China’s point of view, Burma serves political and not just potentially useful 
military purposes. China’s push to establish its international legitimacy, showcased by 
the extravagant 2008 summer Olympic Games, led to more pressure being put on it to 
address humanitarian and security issues with partner nations North Korea, Sudan, Iran, 
Zimbabwe, and Burma.184  China sought to moderate the SPDC’s hard line on dissidents 
and turned to Prime Minister Khin Nyunt (whom China considered a Deng Xiaoping 
style reformer) to transform policy.185  When Khin Nyunt was ousted in 2004, the junta 
took a harder stance on protestors and China’s ability to sway the regime to more 
moderate policies faded.   
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Nevertheless, China did not turn its back on its key strategic ally.  In mid-2006, 
the United States circulated a resolution in the Security Council demanding the release of 
political prisoners, condemning Burma’s human rights practices, and calling for a 
political process that would lead to a genuine democratic transition, but China vetoed the 
resolution—the first time since 1973 that Beijing vetoed any matter unrelated to 
Taiwan.186 China at times treats Burma as a client state, but also attempts to distance it 
from the junta following brutal episodes of repression.  Following the junta’s recent 
violent reaction to the Saffron Revolution, the Chinese regime carefully balanced its 
response to the incident in the international press.  The Burmese junta continues to rely 
on China and to a lesser extent Russia to shield it from the influence of the U.S., Britain, 
and France on the UN Security Council.   
What does the future hold for Burma’s relationship with China?  It seems that as 
China becomes increasingly influential in world politics the Chinese might seek greater 
legitimacy in the realm of foreign affairs.  Under these circumstances, China would feel 
pressure to use its influence on the junta to improve governance and curtail its human 
rights abuses.  However, so long as Burma provides much-needed natural resources to the 
Chinese and so long as its own poor human rights record and the Tibet occupation remain 
sources of international controversy, change in Burma’s relationship with China is 
unlikely. 
2. Thailand 
Thailand’s relationship with its long time rival Burma improved in the mid 1990s.  
With Burma’s admission to ASEAN in 1997, relations between the two countries looked 
promising.  Spillover from Burma’s domestic problems such as refugees, illegal 
immigrants, and an increasing influx of synthetic drugs did concern Thailand.187 From 
the SPDC’s perspective, the Thai government’s continued allowance of border camps 
that provided sanctuary to Burmese refugees only protracted the rebellion in Burma.  
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Nevertheless, positive relations continued as Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatrad 
committed his government to addressing the SPDC’s main bilateral grievances.188  
Since 2004, Thailand has made passage through its border for Burma’s dissidents 
more difficult.  Burma, for its part, has encouraged investment by Thailand and, 
according to the Thailand Foreign Trade Department, Thailand now ranks third among 
foreign investors in Burma.189 Beginning with Khin Nyunt’s visit to Thailand in 2001, 
Burma and Thailand have signed agreements addressing issues from illegal labor and 
repatriation of refugees to counternarcotics and fishery rights.  As described previously, 
gas pipelines reached Thailand in 1998, and in 2006, Thailand experienced its first 
budget deficit with Burma in eighteen years.190  Also in 2006, the two countries agreed 
to build a hydroelectric power plant on the Thanlwin River with Chinese assistance.
Thailand has deftly implemented a classic hedging strategy by maintaining good 
relations with both China and the United States, even though it has defied the U.S. in its 
recent engagement policies towards Burma. 191 Thailand has also defended Burma within 
ASEAN in light of international pressure on the Association to sanction Burma.  Thailand 
sided with Burma after accusations were leveled against Thailand for its human rights 
abuses and, in the 2004 ASEAN conference, Thailand Prime Minster Thaksin threatened 
to walk out of the conference if the Tak Bai incident was raised by fellow ASEAN 
leaders.192  Recently however, Thailand’s Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has called for 
Burma to do more for its citizens.193  Abhisit announced that the Thai government would 
adopt a “flexible engagement” strategy to foster open and frank discussion on issues such 
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as human rights, leading to cooperative solutions that will make Southeast Asia a more 
secure and prosperous region.194 With Abhisit recently appointed to chair the ASEAN, 
one has to wonder, though, how much his statement should be attributed to political 
rhetoric.   
The U.S. and EU have pressured Thailand to use its influence to get Burma to live 
up to its commitment to hold elections in 2010.  Thailand, embroiled in its own internal 
struggle in Southern Thailand, needs Western support for its counterinsurgency efforts, 
but still seeks open trade with Burma.  For a host of reasons, Thailand’s relationship with 
Burma will likely continue to be a balancing act of East versus West, with the Thais 
attempting to stay in the good graces of the West while benefitting economically from 
trade relations with Burma and China. 
3. India 
India is another country that has reversed its policies toward Burma based on its 
desire for stability in its northeast region, a growing need for raw materials to feed its 
industrial growth, and security concerns over Chinese expansion into the Bay of Bengal.  
In 1988, after the SLORC’s crackdown on the pro-democracy movement, India became 
its most vociferous critic.195  India provided NLD protestors modest support when they 
fled to the Burma-India border, and again in 1990 when Burmese dissidents hijacked a 
Thai Airways plane and had it flown to India; Indian officials released the hijackers much 
to the anger of the SLORC.196  
India’s stance toward Burma began to change in the early 1990s following Rajiv 
Gandhi’s assassination.  Around this time, China improved its relations with Pakistan and 
Bangladesh and, as the Chinese increased trade and diplomacy with Burma, India felt 
China squeezing it via its neighbors. As a result, India decided to place economics and 
security ahead of political and human rights considerations.197 In the latter part of the 
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1990s as Burma looked to diversify and actively sought political and military exchanges 
and economic cooperation with India, India was receptive.198 
For decades, Burma turned a blind eye to the presence of anti-Indian groups 
operating out of the remote Naga, Patkai, and Lushai hills, while India offered tacit 
support to Kachin rebels.199 Following the Kachin ceasefire in 1993, India pushed for 
military cooperation with Burma leading to the Indian Army and Tatmadaw conducting a 
joint counterinsurgency operation called Golden Bird.200 Cooperation between Burma 
and India has partially neutralized the anti-Indian insurgencies in the northeast part of  
India.  However, despite arms sales to Burma and Indian intelligence provided to the 
Tatmadaw, the Indians have still been frustrated by the Tatmadaw’s lack of progress in 
eliminating insurgents in the border areas.   
Anticipating the economic rise of Southeast Asia, India adopted a “Look East 
Policy” in 1991 to gain increased economic and strategic influence in the region.201 
Burma and India opened their first official border crossing in 1995 and bilateral trade 
between the two countries grew from $62.15 million in fiscal year 1988-89 to a 
remarkable $328.53 million in 1997-98.202 India initiated numerous economic projects 
with Burma in the 1990s to include railway and port construction, hydroelectric plants, 
and natural resource extraction ventures.  India has had some success tapping into natural 
gas reserves from Burma, but, as previously mentioned, the Chinese trumped the Indians 
in developing the Sittwe natural gas project in Arakan.   
Countering China’s influence in Burma has been a top priority in New Delhi.  
India has been wary of China’s increased military influence in Burma through arms sales 
and the potential for Chinese naval facilities to be built in the Bay of Bengal.  India, in 
response, has embarked on a “constructive engagement” strategy toward Burma.203 In 
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recent years, the Indian Navy has increased cooperation with Burma’s Navy.  India has 
conducted bilateral Indo-Burmese naval exercises and docked its naval ships in Rangoon.   
Although New Delhi over the past fifteen years has grown substantially closer to 
the Burmese junta, Burma’s xenophobic view of India dating back to colonial times when 
India dominated Burma, still creates an underlying sense of mistrust especially of Indian 
nationals living in Burma.204 However, along with China, India has the greatest 
international influence on the SPDC, and will be a key factor in bringing about change in 
Burmese international politics. 
4. Japan 
Japan’s relationship with modern Burma largely originates in Japan’s World War 
II occupation and the evolution of independent Burma’s early leadership, several of 
whose members belonged to the Thirty Comrades.  Post-World War II Japan paid war 
reparations to Burma, the first Asian country to receive these payments. Reparations 
paved the way for further Japanese assistance given to Burma during Ne Win’s reign. 
Japan provided two thirds of all the bilateral (nation-to-nation) Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) disbursements to Burma, amounting to US$1.94 billion in grants and 
loans between 1970 and 1988.205  
Tokyo’s dealings with its longtime ally Ne Win were much more conciliatory 
than with follow-on regimes.  The inept socialist government of the BSSP made Japanese 
investment in Burma risky.  When the SLORC opened Burma to foreign investors after 
1988, Japan faced the dilemma of either falling in line with Western sanctions or 
exploiting economic opportunities in Burma. Japan adopted ‘quiet dialogue’ as an 
alternative to sanctions. Quiet dialogue called for open discussion to persuade the 
Burmese to work toward democracy and prioritize human rights.206 The Japanese 
resumed ODA in 1989, and initially believed that their assistance (as part of their ‘quiet 
dialogue’ effort) helped prompt the SLORC to call for open elections in 1990.207  When 
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the SLORC nullified the 1990 elections, the Japanese distanced themselves from Burma. 
But with the improved economic situation in 1994, Japanese companies pushed to re-
engage, and the Japanese construction company Mitsui Bussan, All Nippon Airlines, and 
Nippon Oil Company all invested in projects in Burma.208   
The Japanese have encountered problems similar to those of other foreign 
investors who must maneuver through Burma’s ineffective banking system and artificial 
exchange rate.  Over time, they have tended to weight their investments toward the 
extractive industries, tapping into Burma’s natural resources of natural gas, teak, and 
gems. The Japanese have shied away from perceived risky Burmese investments, 
anticipating possible SPDC interference or, at worst, nationalization.  
Japan has continued to provide assistance to Burma, but has differed with the 
United States on the nature of its ‘humanitarian’ aid. To the Japanese, ‘humanitarian’ aid 
includes refurbishing older infrastructure, such as hydroelectric plants and the Rangoon 
Airport.  The U.S. definition of humanitarian aid is assistance to improve health, 
education, nutrition, and agriculture.209  Japanese policy toward Burma remains 
ambiguous as it condemns the junta and yet believes it can sway the regime with carrots.  
The SPDC does not view Japan as a strong an ally as Ne Win did, and with China playing 
a dominant role in Burma’s affairs, the Japanese are marginalized in their influence.   
5. Bangladesh 
Bangladesh’s importance to the ruling junta stems from its geographic location as 
a border country and thanks to shared maritime boundaries near large deposits of natural 
gas.  Over the past decade, there has been a sharp rise in trade between the two countries.  
Bilateral trade between Burma and Bangladesh now stands at US $140 million.210 
However, the two countries have mobilized forces along the border after Burma’s navy 
intruded into Bangladesh’s waters in November 2008, and tension has further grown over 
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the issue of the status of Muslim Rohingya.  As the result of a Tatmadaw offensive 
against Muslim insurgents back in 1991-92, an estimated 250,000 Rohingya crossed the 
Burmese border into the Cox Bazaar region of Bangladesh.211 While the majority of the 
Rohingya returned to Burma after intervention by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the un-repatriated Rohingya remains a problem 
in Burma.212  
Trade has increased significantly between the two countries over the past decade 
and Burma can further strengthen its regional position through good relations with 
Bangladesh.  Internal issues that generate regional problems continue to hamper the 
junta’s desire to expand influence in the region.  If Burma cannot resolve its maritime 
border or Rohingya refugee problems with Bangladesh, then the SPDC potentially will 
lose legitimacy as its problems spill over to negatively impact other countries in the 
region.   
6. Singapore 
Aside from China, Singapore was Burma’s largest investor and has long provided 
Burma with military hardware and telecommunications equipment.213  Singapore has 
been accused of laundering Burmese drug money, although the Singaporean Government 
strongly denies this.214 Using a ‘constructive engagement’ approach, Singaporeans have 
invested heavily in hotel construction and management, built shopping centers, and 
provided transportation and other services to tourists in Burma.  Singapore, which itself 
employs tight control measures over its population, has engaged in trade and investment 
with Burma without condemning the junta’s repressiveness.  Singapore’s position is not 
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to judge the SLORC/SPDC.215 The fact that Singapore is powerful trading partner, but 
does not appear willing to link trade or investment with reform further undercuts Western 
sanctions. 
7. European Union 
Since the 1980s, European governments have promoted human rights and 
fundamental freedoms through implementation of the European Union’s (EU) Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.216 In 1996, the EU passed the ‘Common Position’ on 
Burma.217 Since the late 1990s the ruling Burmese junta has pursued three objectives: 
first, to improve Burma’s image in Europe through information campaigns which seek to 
persuade European decision-makers to adopt a more empathetic and productive position 
on Burma; second, to win more humanitarian assistance for Burma; and third, to gain 
admission to two major inter-regional dialogues, the ASEAN-EU and Asia-Europe 
Meetings (ASEM).218 Both of these dialogues promote trade and investment between 
countries on both continents.   
Although the Burmese government has not been very successful in swaying the 
EU to relax any of its sanctions or policies, EU sanctions are not nearly as stringent or 
restrictive as U.S. sanctions.  The ‘Common Position’ imposes restrictions on trade and 
travel, and embargoes arms, munitions, and related equipment.  It suspends economic aid, 
excepting humanitarian and poverty aid, as well as visas for higher-level senior junta 
officers.219  In the aftermath of the Saffron Revolution, the EU banned firms from buying 
gems, timber, and metal from Burma.220   
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At a meeting in Brussels in 2008, the International Trade Union Confederation 
(ITUC) criticized the EU for not being restrictive enough against Burma.221 The ITUC 
argued that, despite the additional post-Saffron Revolution sanctions, the EU, by not 
banning the sale and trade of natural gas and oil with European firms, has not gone far 
enough in hurting the junta.222 For instance, the French firm Total has been generating 
cash flows from natural gas for the junta since the 1990s, of which very little has trickled 
down to the Burmese population.  The United States continually urges the EU to step up 
its sanctions. But, as demonstrated in the past two decades, the EU derives benefits from 
a portion of its investments in Burma that it is not willing to give up. 
8. ASEAN  
Formed in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) originally 
consisted of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines.  Five more 
Southeast Asian nations joined ASEAN between 1984 and 1999, to include Brunei, 
Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Cambodia.  The ASEAN Declaration states that the aims and 
purposes of the Association are: (1) to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and 
cultural development in the region; and (2) to promote regional peace and stability 
through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in adherence to the principles of 
the United Nations Charter.223 At bottom, the Association’s “ASEAN Way” is moral 
suasion – the belief (or hope) that member states will do the right thing so as not to 
embarrass the collectivity.224  
Burma has neither met the intent of the ASEAN Declaration nor acted in an 
“ASEAN Way.” ASEAN, however, has a non-interference norm that states that each 
member’s domestic affairs are not any other member’s concern.  So, while Burma clearly 
violates the intent of ASEAN’s goals, no other member state has taken action to make 
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Burma comply.  In 2007 ASEAN drew up a new Charter which was signed by all ten 
members stipulating norms such as democracy and human rights.225 This formal 
commitment to human rights and democracy associates ASEAN with such prominent 
international institutions as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the European Union (EU), as well as the UN.226 
Burma’s nullification of the 1990 elections and subsequent decades-long 
repression of pro-democracy dissidents, combined with its atrocious human rights record, 
creates an international credibility problem for ASEAN.  Furthermore, the ruling junta’s 
refusal to release Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest has led ASEAN members to 
appeal to the junta to work through the UN to secure her release.  ASEAN members 
resent Burma’s actions and their inability to force the SPDC to reform has created rifts 
within the organization.  At the same time, the United States and the European Union 
consistently pressure ASEAN to persuade Burma to reform, much to the annoyance of 
ASEAN’s members.  ASEAN was originally established to create a union of smaller 
nations to minimize outside influence by the superpowers and what Burma has done in 
many members’ view is to bring undesirable international attention. One can only wonder 
what might happen if house arrest for Aung San Suu Kyi is not ended as scheduled in 
May 2009, and if the 2010 elections are exposed as a sham or nullified by the junta as 
occurred in 1990.  Will ASEAN be willing to once again lose worldwide credibility on 
Burma’s behalf, or will it be willing to cut Burma away?  
E. CONCLUSION 
Burma is a country that welcomed foreign investment and trade after Ne Win 
stepped down in 1988.  The country’s natural resources, abundant and inexpensive labor 
pool, and relative control over its population, make potential external investors willing to 
overlook the junta’s repression.  Easily extractable (if not also ‘lootable’) Burmese 
resources draw short term, risk-averse investors, who are seldom particularly interested in 
the country’s long-term future. Meanwhile, there are Burma’s neighbors who have a 
 
225 Simon, “ASEAN and Multilateralism,” 278. 
226 Ibid. 
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geopolitical stake in Burma’s future, and are reluctant to intercede in the SPDC’s internal 
affairs, no matter how egregious the junta’s crimes against its own population.  Western 
activists’ ability to curb the regime’s human rights violations have been marginalized by 
the SPDC’s relations with countries not providing Burma with critical goods it depends 
on.  Ironically, several Western companies have been critical to Burma’s development of 
its natural gas infrastructure.  Pressure to reform has been scant from key regional 
players, particularly the ASEAN countries who stand by the Association’s non-
interference principle, allowing Burma’s human rights abuses and corruption to go 
unchecked.  China, which uses harsh measures to control its own population, has 
refrained from reprimanding Burma and will remain Burma’s strongest ally and its most 
outspoken defender in the UN.   
The next chapter will examine the effects U.S. sanctions have had on the ruling 
junta and explore U.S. options to effect change, along with what sets of change(s) the 
U.S. might want to seek.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
For us, giving a banana to the monkey and then asking it to dance is not 
the way.  We are not monkeys.227  
U Win Aung 
Burmese Foreign Minister 
A. UNITED STATES SANCTIONS 
The United States has sought for two decades to compel the ruling Burmese junta 
through economic sanctions to reform its human rights abuses. In the wake of the 1988 
pro-democracy uprising in Burma, the U.S. cut off all bilateral and multinational 
financial aid and development assistance, prohibited arms sales, and downgraded 
diplomatic representation in Burma from ambassador to a charge d’ affaires.228 In 1997, 
the Clinton Administration imposed a ban on new foreign investment in Burma. And, in 
2003, President George W. Bush signed into law a much stronger set of economic 
sanctions, the “Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act.”229  
The 2003 sanctions consist of four main components: an extension of the visa ban 
on officials of the SPDC and USDA; a freeze on the U.S. assets of Burmese officials; a 
ban on financial transactions between American parties and “entities of the Rangoon 
regime” (save for those that receive special exemptions from the U.S. Treasury 
Department, such as NGOs working on humanitarian projects); and, most importantly, an 
embargo on all imports from Burma to the United States.230 Following the Saffron 
Revolution in 2007,  President Bush  further strengthened the 2003 sanctions,  identifying  
 
227 Fink, Living Silence, 4. 
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more SPDC leaders and their families for visa restrictions, and freezing assets for 11 
more officials.231  The President also tightened export control regulations on “dual-use” 
and high performance computers to Burma.232  
These sanctions were intended to punish the regime for human rights abuses while 
indirectly showing support for Aung San Suu Kyi and the democratic movement, as well 
as for ethnic minorities. Somehow, it was assumed this would pressure the ruling junta to 
change its policies and behavior.  Yet, after twenty years, most observers agree that none 
of the U.S. sanctions on the SLORC/SPDC have met our goals.  Sanctions have had some 
impact on Burma’s textile industry, according to David I. Steinberg who estimates the 
embargo closed 64 textile factories, but not enough to impress the need for change on the 
regime.233  At the same time, critics can point to sanctions having had all sorts of 
detrimental effects on workers, many of whom are women who likely fall into the sex 
trade after textile jobs are lost.   
There are several reasons why sanctions have failed to sway the junta. First and 
foremost, regardless of the regime’s policy to open itself up to foreign investment and 
trade, the SLORC/SPDC has not had to rely on the U.S. and EU to build up foreign 
currency and markets.  Burma’s trading partners in Asia, with China in the lead, have 
allowed the junta to generate wealth without needing the West. Second, even if sanctions’ 
unintended impacts on the population could have led to the population rising up and 
trying to force a change in government, the ruling junta has shown thus far that it is 
capable of putting down popular rebellions. Finally, the SPDC has demonstrated 
repeatedly that it has little regard for the welfare of the Burmese people.  Never was this 
more evident than in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis when the junta initially refused 
foreign aid and assistance. 
Sanctions against Burma are based on the assumption that the junta will adjust 
policy in response to economic incentives (or disincentives) when in fact the generals are 
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much more concerned with enforcing a political monopoly, and holding onto power, 
rather than maximizing their own economic advantage.234  The regime is not just 
promoting its own propaganda when, as stated in Chapter I, it prioritizes the three main 
national causes (national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national solidarity) over 
economic prosperity. This orientation justifies the SLORC/SPDC’s actions no matter 
how brutal—and, in the junta’s eyes, validates its legitimacy. 
B. LEGITIMACY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
When analyzing sanctions it seems worthwhile to step back and ask why the 
sanctions were enforced in the first place.  In theory, the U.S. put sanctions in place to 
induce the SLORC/SPDC to stop its human rights abuses and to punish the regime for 
failing to uphold the results of the 1990 elections. The sanctions were levied by the U.S. 
to promote democracy through Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, and to weaken the 
illegitimate government of the SLORC/SPDC.  In the West’s view, the fact that the 
SLORC did not abide by the elections in 1990, and relinquish power to Aung San Suu 
Kyi and the NLD makes it illegitimate.  Engaging in repressive control measures, human 
rights abuses, and drug trafficking only compounds the junta’s negative image.  So the 
U.S. deemed the junta illegitimate, this begs the next question: how many more 
delegitimizing acts does the regime have to engage in before the U.S. will feel impelled 
(or compelled) to intervene?  
Since the end of the Cold War, causes for U.S. intervention have varied.  In the 
1990s, the U.S. intervened in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia largely for humanitarian 
reasons. Furthermore, in 1999, a U.S. led NATO coalition forced Serbian President 
Slobodan Milosevic to end ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo and, according to 
Harvard professor Stanley Hoffman, “a new norm was established: collective 
intervention against a government committing human rights violations could be 
justified.”235  The precedents for humanitarian intervention established in the 1990s gave 
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way in the new millennium to sovereignty breaches following the attacks of 9/11 in 
Afghanistan and Iraq for the sake of curbing terrorism.236 
C. THE UNITED STATES AND BURMESE SOVEREIGNTY 
1. Indirect Approach 
The likelihood is remote that the U.S. will engage Burma militarily solely for 
humanitarian purposes or to enforce the outcome of the 2010 elections.  The American 
public, given current commitments, will not support sending a sizable number of troops 
to Burma for anything less than an emergency situation. What some in Washington might 
decide to do instead is employ an indirect unconventional warfare (UW) approach with 
Special Forces working with the ethnic minority insurgents and pro-democracy 
movement to encourage regime change. But even an indirect approach with a small 
footprint is infeasible for several reasons.   
The Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia (indirectly) are engaged in 
counterinsurgencies or anti-terrorist campaigns. Transnational terrorists find sanctuary in 
Bangladesh. North Korea tested a nuclear device in 2006 and again in 2009.  Cambodia is 
trying to re-establish stability following years of internal strife.  In 2006 testimony before 
the House Armed Services Committee, the PACOM Commander highlighted 19 Asian 
countries as regional priorities or interests without mentioning Burma.237  
To execute unconventional operations in Burma would require that the U.S. 
secure basing access in a border country.  Given current ties to the junta, Thailand, India, 
and Bangladesh would be hesitant to support cross-border U.S. operations to train and 
advise Karen, Shan, Chin, and Rohingya insurgents. Also, Burma’s remaining insurgent 
groups (those who refused to sign ceasefire agreements) have been weakened by years of 
conflict with the Tatmadaw.  They have yet to agree on their strategic goals, while the 
pro-democracy movement remains as distant from them as ever. 
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2. Future Engagement in Burma 
At present, the insurgent and pro-democracy groups continue their rebellions with 
little support from external allies.  The upcoming 2010 elections may present an 
opportunity for the groups to elevate their cause(s) onto the international stage if the 
election is corrupted or nullified by the SPDC.  In the meantime, what are viable options 
for U.S. engagement?   
Retaining sanctions will not significantly impact the regime. Nevertheless, to 
abandon sanctions in favor of constructive engagement will benefit the regime. Such a 
move would provide little assistance to the population. According to COL (RET) Tim 
Heinemann, who has worked extensively in the region with ethnic groups, hill tribes and 
pro-democracy activists, the power base of the junta rests with generals Than Shwe at the 
head, and Maung Aye as his deputy.238 COL Heinemann adds that the two leaders differ 
with Than Shwe being more corrupt and power-driven, while Maung Aye is a 
professional soldier with a loyal following among the general officer corps.  
Psychological operations targeted at the heads of the regime could be effective given 
their superstitious beliefs and differing outlooks.239   
As Doug Bandow of the Cato Institute points out, NGOs offer some degree of 
access to Burma. NGOs conducted relief efforts in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis:  
“…it is possible to work with the military regime on humanitarian issues. 
Communication between the government and international agencies has 
improved. Visas and travel permits today are easier to get than before.  
Requirements for the launch of new aid projects have been eased.  By and 
large, the authorities are making efforts to facilitate aid, including 
allowing a substantial role for civil society.”240 
 
However, most are reluctant to cooperate with the U.S. government. 
In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN did initiate disaster response 
exercises, first in Thailand in 2008 followed by an exercise in the Philippines in 2009.   
The United States could play a key role in future Asian disaster relief and could 
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potentially use preparedness training to gain access to Burma.  For instance, through 
regional assessments of the infrastructure in ASEAN countries, the U.S. should be able to 
push survey teams into Burma for disaster relief preparation.  
3. Nuclear Intervention 
Is there anything today that might compel the United States to do more?  Two 
issues that could lead the U.S. to take concerted action are to halt work on nuclear 
weapons or to stop a possible pandemic.  In 2007, Burma and Russia signed an 
agreement for construction of a Russian nuclear research reactor in Burma. The SPDC 
appears ready to pursue a nuclear program, which would enable the junta to eventually 
develop a nuclear weapon that would create a quandary for the U.S.  To prevent another 
North Korea or Iran, the U.S. might feel justified to attack Burma’s nuclear infrastructure 
early in development with Special Operations Forces.  
But, realistically, is this something the U.S. would do? Intervention in Burma is 
complicated, in part because Burma has achieved some international legitimacy through 
its relationships with regional powers, China and India, and its membership in ASEAN.  
An attack on Burma would provoke not only a regional, but also an international 
response, and surely the majority of Asian countries would not support such an attack 
despite a potential nuclear threat from Burma.  With China’s (and Russia’s) veto power 
and track record, a UN Resolution for intervention would die quickly in the Security 
Council and forming a coalition would also be politically difficult. It is likely the U.S. 
would have to act unilaterally if it acted at all.   
4. Pandemic Intervention 
Burma also has the potential for a pandemic influenza outbreak which could 
potentially spread throughout the country and then beyond its borders.  The country is 
woefully unprepared for such an outbreak.  For example, lymphatic filariasis 
(elephantiasis) remains highly endemic in Burma due to a weak medical infrastructure, 
large populations of displaced individuals, and health care workers subjected to arrest and 
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abuse for perceived support of insurgents.241  A pandemic, which would expand rapidly 
within Burma, would spread quickly beyond Burma’s borders.  Eliminating the source 
would be difficult, especially for a government unprepared to deal with such an outbreak, 
and one that would probably be reluctant to accept foreign assistance to contain the virus.  
Again, a forced intervention may be necessary to contain the disease and to provide care 
to the sick and dying.  
D. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
For the future of Burma, the best-case scenario would be for the 2010 elections to 
be held, for the SPDC to lose the popular election, then honor the elections, step down, 
and allow a new popular government to take power.  This is highly unlikely to occur. 
But, even in this ideal situation, Burma’s new leaders would face the challenge of uniting 
the country’s ethnic minorities who would no doubt demand autonomy or a federal 
system of government.  The new government would also have to re-energize the 
economy in an attempt to halt or slow inflation.  There is the potential for elements of 
Than Shwe’s Union Solidarity and Development Association to form insurgencies, but 
the biggest challenge would be to integrate the Tatmadaw into the new government, 
subordinate to democratic civilian rule.  No matter who rises to power in Burma, they 
will have to deal with the Tatmadaw. 
The U.S. also, should consider how it might work with the Tatmadaw, if not 
directly, then indirectly.  Perhaps engagement can start small by planting long-term 
seeds.  For instance, Burma currently sends officers to other countries in the region for 
military schooling and training.  Singapore educates Burmese officers in its military 
schools, and U.S. officers attending Singaporean military schools with Burmese officers 
can try to develop relations with their Burmese classmates in order to foster rapport for 
mil-to-mil cooperation 10-15 years in the future.242 
At present though, and aside from its drug ‘exports,’ Burma poses little direct 
threat to U.S. national security.  Terrorist groups do not emanate from Burma and pirates 
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do not impede shipping off the coast.  Ideally, the U.S. might increase pressure on 
countries in the region to divest from Burma, similar to what occurred in South Africa 
where international pressure in the form of boycotts weakened the South African 
economy.243  But as already noted, countries in the region have too much of a stake in 
Burma to side with the U.S. and divest. 
President Bush’s statement found at the beginning of this thesis, points to 
Burma’s real threat. Given our declared policies and Burma’s humanitarian abuses and 
rejection of democracy, we may have hoisted ourselves on our own petard.  The United 
States’ reputation as an ethical and moral world leader has been closely scrutinized since 
the 9/11 attacks. The Obama administration initially planned to re-evaluate sanctions and 
contemplated opening trade with Burma.  However, in response to the junta’s decision in 
May 2009 to charge Aung San Suu Kyi with allowing an American to enter her home, 
President Obama extended sanctions against Burma for another year.  He stated: 
The crisis between the United States and Burma…has not been 
resolved…These actions and policies are hostile to U.S. interests…For 
this reason, I have determined that it is necessary to…maintain in force the 
sanctions against Burma to respond to this threat.244  
 
Even U.S. presidents with differing political philosophies find common moral 
ground when dealing with the Burmese regime. However the practical options open to 
U.S. engagement with Burma are few.  At a minimum, the U.S. can maintain indirect 
engagement and maintain the moral high ground.  Someday, authoritarian rule in Burma 
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